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General Introduction
This Dissertation is composed of two Chapters which can be read independently. Each
Chapter consists of a self-contained empirical study of an economic issue from the field
of macroeconomics. While the questions addressed in the two Chapters stem from differ-
ent fields of research - the first Chapter addresses a question from the field of monetary
economics, whereas the second Chapter contains an empirical study on intergenerational
mobility - they share a similar methodological approach.
The first Chapter of my Dissertation is concerned with the transmission of monetary
policy decisions to real economic activity. I show that US manufacturing industries react
vastly different to monetary policy shocks. I use the heterogeneity in output responses to
monetary policy shocks across industries to test whether industries with a higher degree
of price stickiness react more strongly to monetary policy shocks, as predicted by New
Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
The second Chapter of my Dissertation provides new evidence on the extent and the
geography of intergenerational mobility in Germany. This chapter is coauthored with Majed
Dodin, Sebastian Findeisen and Dominik Sachs. We show that intergenerational mobility,
measured by the association of the educational attainment of children in secondary school
and their parents income, differs substantially across regions within Germany.
The Appendix collects additional material for each Chapter, e.g. additional data de-
scriptions and additional Tables and Figures. The Dissertation closes with a bibliography
collecting the references that I used in writing my Dissertation.
While the two Chapters address rather different questions, they share a similar method-
ological approach. The empirical approach taken in both Chapters follows the same general
steps. Both Chapters document heterogeneity in the relationship between two variables
across different economic units. The first Chapter documents heterogeneity in the rela-
tionship between output and monetary policy shocks across industries, whereas the second
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Chapter documents heterogeneity in the relationship between parent income and the edu-
cational attainment of children across local labor markets. Both Chapters use this hetero-
geneity across units to investigate the economic mechanisms linking the two variables. This
common methodological approach unifies the two Chapters.
In the remainder of this Introduction, I present an overview over each Chapter.
Chapter 1: Sectoral Output Effects of Monetary Policy:
Do Sticky Prices Matter?
This Chapter studies the role of sticky prices for the monetary transmission mechanism.
New Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism greatly emphasize the role
of nominal rigidities, in particular price stickiness, for the monetary transmission mecha-
nism (Gal´ı (2015)). If sticky prices play an important role in the monetary transmission
mechanism, the output of industries with a higher degree of price stickiness should react
more strongly to monetary policy shocks than the output of industries with a lower degree of
price stickiness. I investigate this testable implication of New Keynesian models using dis-
aggrated US industrial production data. I estimate the dynamic output responses of 205 US
manufacturing industries to identified monetary policy shocks in a panel VAR framework.
I find substantial heterogeneity in the output responses of industries to monetary policy
shocks. I show that an industry’s output response to monetary policy shocks is systemati-
cally related to an industry’s degree of price stickiness as measured by the average frequency
of price adjustment. The size of the differential reaction between sticky price and flexible
price industries is economically large and statistically significant. This result is robust to
controlling for further industry-level variables, the identification strategy of monetary policy
shocks and the estimation method. The results suggest that sticky prices play an important
role in the transmission of monetary policy to real economic activity, consistent with New
Keynesian macroeconomic models.
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Chapter 2: The Geography of Intergenerational Mobil-
ity in Germany
This Chapter is co-authored with Majed Dodin, Sebastian Findeisen and Dominik Sachs.
We present new empirical evidence on the level and the geography of intergenerational mo-
bility in Germany using administrative microcensus data from the years 2009 to 2015. This
data contains detailed information on the educational attainment of 268.000 children aged
16 to 22 and their parents socioeconomic status. In our main approach, we measure in-
tergenerational mobility by the association between the educational attainment of a child
and her parents income. Our main child outcome variable is a binary variable, indicating
whether a child has obtained an A-Level degree (”Abitur”) (or is in the process of obtain-
ing this degree) or not. We focus on parental income to parsimoniously summarize the
socioeconomic status of parents.
The relationship between a child’s probability of obtaining an A-Level degree and the
percentile rank of parents in the national income distribution is well approximated by a
linear function at the national level. This allows us to summarize intergenerational mobility
by the coefficients of a linear regression of the A-Level dummy of children on the parents
percentile rank in the national income distribution within our sample. Based on the linear
fit, we find that a 10 percentile point increase in parent income rank is associated with a
4.8 percentage point increase in the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for children
at the national level.
We calculate different measures of absolute and relative intergenerational mobility to
compare intergenerational mobility across local labor markets within Germany. We doc-
ument substantial variation in these measures across local labor markets. For example,
the probability that a child from a family in the bottom quintile of the national income
distribution obtains an A-Level degree is 27% in Dresden, but only 16% in Leipzig.
We show that regional differences in intergenerational mobility are not explained by
differences in family characteristics across local labor markets within our sample. Lastly,
we take a first step at describing which local labor market characteristics correlate with
intergenerational mobility.
3
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Chapter 1
Sectoral Output Effects of Monetary
Policy: Do Sticky Prices Matter?
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1.1 Introduction
Do sticky prices matter for the monetary transmission mechanism? Although there is
growing consensus that prices are fixed in the short run at the micro level, the macroeco-
nomic implications of this micro-level price stickiness are heavily debated. On the one hand,
New Keynesian sticky price models postulate that firms face costs of price adjustment, which
causes prices to be sticky in response to real and nominal shocks and that it is this feature
that gives rise to monetary non-neutrality. On the other hand, the observed price rigidity
does not necessarily imply that nominal shocks have real effects. For example Caplin and
Spulber (1987) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) present theoretical models in which prices
are sticky and money is neutral or the response to nominal shocks is only very limited.
The goal of this chapter is to empirically test whether sticky prices matter for the mon-
etary transmission mechanism. If price stickiness plays an important role in the monetary
transmission mechanism, the output of industries with a higher degree of price stickiness
should react more strongly to monetary policy shocks than the output of industries with a
lower degree of price stickiness. This Chapter investigates this testable implication of New
Keynesian models using disaggrated US industrial production data.
The main finding of this Chapter is that there is a statistically significant association
between an industry’s output response to monetary policy shocks and the industry’s degree
of price stickiness, a finding that is new to the literature. The drop in output is estimated
to be larger for sticky price industries (compared to flexible price industries) in response to
a contractionary monetary policy shock. The size of this association is also economically
significant. The cumulative drop in total industrial production is estimated at 0.38% two
years after a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. For the most
sticky price industries in the sample1 the cumulative drop in output is estimated to be twice
as large as the drop in total industrial production at the same horizon in response to the
same monetary policy shock. At the same time, the cumulative drop in output is estimated
at only half the size of the drop in total industrial production for the most flexible price
industries in the sample2 at the same horizon in response to the same monetary policy
shock. Indeed, sticky price industries experience a larger change in output in response to
1Defined as industries at the 10th percentile of the in-sample distribution of the frequency of price
adjustment.
2Defined as industries at the 90th percentile of the in-sample distribution of the frequency of price
adjustment.
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monetary policy shocks, consistent with a New Keynesian price stickiness channel in the
monetary transmission mechanism.
This conclusion is reached in several steps. First, I estimate the output responses of 205
manufacturing industries to monetary policy shocks. Monetary policy shocks are identified
using the financial market based identification of Barakchian and Crowe (2013). Industry-
level output responses to the identified monetary policy shocks are estimated in a Panel
VAR framework. There is substantial heterogeneity in the output responses of industries to
monetary policy shocks. The cumulative drop in total industrial production is 0.38% two
years after an unexpected one standard deviation increase in the policy measure. For some
industries the drop in output is as large as 2%, whereas other industries increase output by
around 0.9% in response to the same shock. In a next step, this heterogeneity in output
responses to monetary policy shocks is used to investigate the transmission channels of
monetary policy to real economic activity.
The goal of this chapter is to asses the role of price stickiness in the monetary transmission
mechanism. Following the empirical literature on price rigidities (e.g. Bils and Klenow
(2004) and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016)), price stickiness is measured via the monthly
frequency of price adjustment at the industry level. The frequency of price adjustment is
calculated for the manufacturing industries in the sample using monthly PPI micro data over
the period from 2005 to 2011.3 The frequency of price adjustment differs greatly between
industries. The most sticky price industries adjust only 4% of prices per month on average
over the sample period. On the other hand, the most flexible price industries adjust 87% of
prices per month. The median frequency of price adjustment of the industries in the sample
is 19%.
In order to asses the association between an industry’s output response to monetary
policy shocks and the industries frequency of price adjustment, the cross-section of industry
responses (at different horizons after the shock has happened) is regressed on the industry-
level (log of the) frequency of price adjustment. More flexible prices are associated with
a less strong drop in output in reaction to contractionary monetary policy shocks. A 10%
increase in the frequency of price adjustment is associated with a 0.035 percentage point
reduction in the cumulative output drop in response to the policy shock (2 years after the
shock). Compared to the cumulative drop in total industrial production index, which is
0.38%, the size of this association is economically (and statistically) significant. A 10%
3I am grateful to Michael Weber for providing the industry-level frequency of price adjustment to me.
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increase in the frequency of price adjustment is associated with a reduction in the output
drop in response to a contractionary policy shock that is as large as 10% of the average drop
in output. Hence an increase in the frequency of price adjustment is associated with a less
strong reaction to monetary policy shocks, consistent with a New Keynesian price stickiness
channel of monetary transmission.
In a next step several additional industry characteristics are added to the regression of
the industry output responses to monetary policy shocks on the log of the frequency of
price adjustment. Industries do not only differ along their frequency of price adjustment
but also along other dimensions. Controlling for additional industry characteristics helps
to disentangle the effect of price stickiness from other potentially confounding factors. The
additional industry characteristics considered here include e.g. measures of external financial
dependence or industry cyclicalty. When controlling for other industry characteristics, the
association between the frequency of price adjustment and the strength of the reaction to
monetary policy shocks becomes even larger, providing further support for a price stickiness
channel in the monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of this introduction presents an overview over the related literature and
a roadmap of the Chapter. The analysis in this Chapter is related to different strands of
the literature on the monetary transmission mechanism. First, it is realted to a number of
papers such as Peersman and Smets (2005), Ganley and Salmon (1997), Hayo and Uhlen-
brock (2000) and Dedola and Lippi (2005) that examine the industry effects of monetary
policy shocks. All these papers find considerable cross-industry heterogeneity in the out-
put reaction to monetary policy shocks (identified from SVARs). While Ganley and Salmon
(1997) and Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000) focus on the UK and Germany, respectively, Dedola
and Lippi (2005) and Peersman and Smets (2005) analyze cross-country differences in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism as well. These papers find that the durability
of industry output is a significant determinant of cross-industry heterogeneity in the out-
put responses to monetary policy shocks, with durable goods producing industries reacting
more strongly. In the US, Carlino and DeFina (1998) find substantial heterogeneity across
regions in the response to monetary policy shocks. None of these papers has considered
heterogeneity in price stickiness as explanatory variable in their analysis of cross-industry
heterogeneity in responses to monetary policy shocks.
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Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) show that after monetary policy announcements the
conditional volatility of stock market returns rises more for firms with stickier prices than
for firms with more flexible prices. Their finding indicates that menu costs are an important
factor causing nominal price rigidities, as presumed by New Keynesian models.
Furthermore, the findings of this Chapter speak to the literature on multi-sector New
Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism. A common finding in the
literature on multi-sector New Keynesian models is that heterogeneity in the degree of price
stickiness across sectors enhances monetary non-neutrality, e.g. Bouakez et al. (2013) or
Pasten et al. (2018b). In these types of models, industries with a higher degree of price
stickiness (ceteris paribus) react more strongly to monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Bouakez
et al. (2013) and Ghassibe (2018)). This finding is not limited to models that use nominal
price rigidities modeled as in Calvo (1983), but can also be extended to multi-sector menu
cost models. For example in the calibrated multi-sector menu cost model of Nakamura and
Steinsson (2010), the output of sectors with a lower frequency of price adjustment reacts
more strongly to nominal demand shocks. The analysis at hand speaks to this literature
by testing this testable implication of multi-sector models of the monetary transmission
mechanism.
It should be noted that testing this prediction of multi-sector New Keynesian models
speaks to New Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism in general. New
Keynesian models greatly emphasize the role of nominal rigidities, in particular price sticki-
ness, for the monetary transmission mechanism and as the source of monetary non-neutrality
policy (Gal´ı (2015)). Hence the test whether price stickiness has a role in explaining differen-
tial industry reactions to monetary policy shocks is an important test of the New Keynesian
paradigm.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the data used in
the analysis. Section 1.3 presents the response of (total) industrial production to monetary
policy shocks. Section 1.4 presents the output responses of 205 manufacturing industries to
monetary policy shocks. Section 1.5 presents the relationship between an industries output
response and the frequency of price adjustment. In Section 1.6 presents this relation when
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controlling for additional industry characteristics. Section 1.7 presents various robustness
checks. Section 1.8 summarizes the results and concludes.
1.2 Data
This Section presents the data used in the main part of the analysis. First, the sectoral
industrial production data is described. Next, I describe how price stickiness is measured at
the industry level. Lastly, the monetary policy shock series used in the analysis is presented.
1.2.1 Sectoral Industrial Production Data
Sectoral industrial production data is obtained from the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. At the most disaggregated level, the Board of Governors publishes
213 monthly industrial production index series, measuring the monthly real output of the
industries covered by these series. These series are the basis used to construct the commonly
used (aggregate) monthly industrial production index for the US. The 213 series cover the
whole manufacturing sector plus part of the mining and utilities sectors. Industries covered
by the industrial production index are classified in the 2007 version of the North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS)4. All series are non-overlapping in terms of NAICS
6-digit industries, i.e. every NAICS 6-digit industry is contained in at most one industrial
production series. The level of disaggregation used here is the finest level of disaggregation
at which monthly industrial production data is published. The analysis here is confined
to industries covered by the industrial production index due to a lack of (disaggregated)
monthly output data for other sectors of the economy (like services). All series are seasonally
adjusted.
The series used in the industrial production index cover the whole manufacturing sector
(NAICS groups 31 - 33), plus those industries that have traditionally been considered to
be manufacturing, namely NAICS 1133 (logging) and 5111 (newspaper publishing)), min-
ing and oil extraction (NAICS groups 211-213) and electrical power generation and gas
distribution (NAICS 2211 and 2212).
4NAICS is the North American Industry Classification System. The finest level of disaggregation avail-
able in this classification scheme is the 6-digit classification. NAICS is a hierarchical classification scheme,
with the digit-length of the NAICS code indicating the level of disaggregation. For example, several NAICS
6-digit industries can share the same 5-digit industry code.
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The Board of Governors does not publish a separate output series for every single NAICS
6-digit industry (which is the finest level of disaggregation in the NAICS classification sys-
tem). Instead, some NAICS 6-digit industries are grouped together with other (similar)
NAICS 6-digit industries that share the same 4- or 5-digit NAICS code.
This leads to the fact that 213 separate industrial production series are available from
the Board of Governors5. I exclude eight series from the following analysis due to missing
data on the frequency of price adjustment for these series. Hence in the following analysis,
205 monthly industrial production series are used.
1.2.2 Data on Price Stickiness
Price stickiness is measured by the (monthly) frequency of price adjustment (FPA) at the
level of the industrial production series. This follows the standard approach in the empirical
literature (e.g. Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Gorodnichenko
and Weber (2016)) to measure the degree of price stickiness via the (monthly) frequency of
price adjustment. A high frequency of price adjustment implies low observed price stickiness,
and vice versa.
The frequency of price adjustment is calculated at the industry level from confidential
microdata underlying the US producer price index (PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS)6. The PPI measures selling prices from the perspective of producers, in contrast to
the CPI which measures prices from the perspective of consumers. For the analysis here,
using the data underlying the PPI is desirable, as prices and output are measured at the
same unit (i.e. the producer of the good).
The PPI tracks monthly prices of all goods-producing industries, such as manufacturing
and mining. Every month, the BLS surveys the prices of around 100,000 individual items to
construct the PPI. The PPI seeks to measure the entire marketed output of US producers
(Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009)). The BLS uses a multi-stage sampling procedure to
select the items included in the PPI. The sampling procedure is summarized here, based on
information given in the BLS Handbook of Methods, Chapter 14.7 Similar summaries of
the sampling procedure for the PPI used by the BLS can be found in e.g. Gorodnichenko
5There are 472 unique 6-digit NAICS industries in the manufacturing sector in the 2007 NAICS classi-
fication.
6I am grateful to Michael Weber for providing the data on the frequency of price adjustment at the
industry level to me.
7Available under https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/ppi-20111028.pdf.
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and Weber (2016), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Pasten et al. (2018a) and Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2009).
In an initial step, the BLS selects the producers, so-called price-forming units, to be
included in the PPI. Selection of price-forming units is stratified by industry and based
on the following procedure. First, for a given industry, the BLS compiles a list of all
establishments (in that industry), based on the information given in the Unemployment
Insurance System8. In the next step, establishments are clustered into so-called price-
forming units. Price-forming units are establishments belonging to the same company,
within the same industry. This ensures that prices are collected at the level relevant for
price setting, as several establishments owned by a single company may be operated as a
cluster and constitute a profit-maximizing center. Finally, a sample of price-forming units
is selected to be included in the PPI, with the probability of selection being proportional to
its employment size9.
After a price-forming unit has been selected (and agreed to participate) in the PPI sur-
vey, the BLS selects which items produced by the price-forming unit are included in the
PPI. Selection of individual items is based on a probability sampling technique called dissag-
gregation. In the dissaggregation procedure, BLS field economists first combine individual
items of a price-forming unit into categories, and assign sampling probabilities to each cat-
egory proportional to the value of shipments within the reporting unit. Next, the selected
categories are broken into additional detail in subsequent stages, until unique items are
identified. If the same item is sold at more than one price, then the all price-determining
characteristics — for example size and unit of shipments, freight type, type of buyer or
color of the item — also must be selected on the basis of probability. This method for
identifying the exact transaction terms and price-determining characteristics ensures that
the same type of transaction is priced over time.
In line with this procedure, the PPI defines prices as “net revenue accruing to a specified
producing establishment from a specified kind of buyer for a specified product shipped under
specified transaction terms on a specified day of the month”. Taxes and fees collected on
behalf of the (federal, state, or local) government are not included in the price. Sales and
temporary reductions are reflected in collected prices in so far as they reduce the revenue
generated by a specific item received by the producer.
8Most employers are legally required to participate in the Unemployment Insurance System.
9Possibly within several strata defined by the BLS for a given industry
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The BLS collect prices from around 25,000 establishments for approximately 100,000
individual items on a monthly basis. Prices are collected by means of a survey that is e-
mailed or faxed to participating establishments. An establishment will remain in the sample
for seven years, until a new sample is selected to account for changes in industry structure
and changing product market conditions within the industry.
The prices of individual items (defined as above) reported in the PPI database are used to
calculate the frequency of price adjustment (FPA) at the industry-level. The FPA at the in-
dustry level is calculated using the same method as Pasten et al. (2018a) and Gorodnichenko
and Weber (2016). This method is described here.
First, the FPA is calculated for every single item in the data. The FPA at the item
level is calculated as the ratio of the number of price changes to the number of sample
months. To illustrate this, consider the following (hypothetical) example. Suppose an item
is observed in the data for 5 months. The observed price path of this item is $10 for two
months and then $15 for another three months. Here, one price change occurs during five
months, hence the frequency of price adjustment is 1/5 for this item. Price changes due to
sales are uncommon in PPI data, but are excluded in the calculation of the FPA, following
Pasten et al. (2018a) and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). To calculate the FPA at the
industry-level, the item-based frequencies are aggregated to the industry level, giving equal
weight to all products produced by this industry. The FPA of an industry is hence given as
the average FPA of all items produced by this industry.
Industry-level frequencies are calculated at the NAICS 6-digit, 5-digit, 4-digit and 3-digit
level. The industry-level frequencies of price adjustment are matched to the corresponding
industrial production series.10
The PPI sample used to calculate frequency of price adjustment ranges from the years
2005 to 2011. The average monthly frequency of price adjustment across all industrial
production series is 23.37%, implying an average price duration, −1/ln(1 − FPA), of 3.7
months. Substantial heterogeneity is present in the frequency across sectors, ranging from
10If an industrial production series consists of multiple NAICS 6-digit industries, but does not cover the
whole (corresponding) NAICS 5-digit industry, the series is assigned the mean of the FPA of the included
NAICS 6-digit industries (giving equal weight to all industries). Consider the following example. There are
4 different NAICS 6-digit industries included in a specific NAICS 5-digit industry. The Board of Governors
reports an output series for the first NAICS 6-digit industry and a series reporting the combined output of
the remaining three NAICS 6-digit industries. The first series, consisting of a single industry, is assigned
the frequency of price adjustment of the corresponding NAICS 6-digit industry. The other series is assigned
the average of the reported FPA of the three NAICS 6-digit industries included in the series. This method
is used to calculate the FPA for 33 industrial production series.
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as low as 4.01% (for Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing, NAICS 333295) to as high
as 87.5 % (for Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction, NAICS 211111). Detailed
summary statistics for the frequency of price adjustment can be found in Table A.1 in
the Appendix. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows a histogram of the distribution of the
frequency of price adjustment (left Panel) and the distribution of the log of the frequency of
price adjustment (right Panel). Around 50% of industries in the sample have a frequency of
price adjustment between 15% and 25% per month (corresponding to an average duration
between 6 and 3.5 months).
1.2.3 Monetary Policy Shocks
Identification of unanticipated, presumably exogenous shocks to monetary policy is a
widely discussed topic in the macroeconomic literature. This paper does not propose a new
identification scheme for monetary policy shocks, but uses an existing measure of monetary
policy shocks from the literature, namely the one proposed by Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
Monetary policy shocks in Barakchian and Crowe (2013) are identified as the (financial-
market based) ‘surprise’ component of monetary policy actions, estimated using movements
in Fed Funds futures contract prices on the day of monetary policy announcements following
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
Here, I describe the identification of monetary policy shocks in Barakchian and Crowe
(2013) in detail, following their exposition closely. Barakchian and Crowe (2013) identify
monetary policy shocks using high-frequency data on Federal Funds futures contracts, finan-
cial derivatives whose payoff is calculated based on the effective federal funds rate. Federal
Funds futures contracts have been traded since October 1988 (see e.g. So¨derstro¨m (2001)).
The price of a futures contract for month m+h (i.e. at a horizon h from the current month
m) is a bet on the monthly average effective Fed Funds rate in month m+h, here denoted by
r¯em+h. As Barakchian and Crowe (2013) point out, the average effective Funds Rate might
differ from the average target Fed Funds rate (r¯m+h, the policy rate set by the Fed) due to
implementation errors on part of the Fed:
r¯em+h = r¯m+h + m+h (1.1)
where m+h is the average targeting error for month m+ h. The futures rate on day d in
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month m with horizon h is then given by
fhd = Ed(r¯
e
m+h) + ρ
h
d (1.2)
where ρhd is a possible risk premium. Under the assumption of an unchanged risk premium
and no change in the expected average targeting error during subsequent calendar months
(h ≥ 1), the change in the expected target rate following a policy announcement on a day
d of month m is given by
∆Edr¯m+h = f
h
d − fhd−1 (1.3)
The change in the remainder of the current month (with length M days) is given by
∆Edr¯m =
M
M − d(f
0
d − f 0d−1) (1.4)
so the change in the expected target rate is proportional to the (scaled) jump in the
futures rate around the policy announcement.
Barakchian and Crowe (2013) calculate the change in the futures rate by comparing the
end of day price on the day following the (last) day of an FOMC meeting with that on the
meeting day for meetings occurring before February 1994. After February 1994, the change
in the futures rate is calculated by comparing the end of day price on the meeting day with
the end of day price on the day before the meeting. The analysis is confined to days with
FOMC meetings, inter-meeting changes in the target rate are not considered.
The change in the futures rate is calculated for 6 different maturities, starting with the
future contract maturing in the current month (h = 0), up to the future contract maturing
five months after the meeting (h = 5). The monetary policy shock measure is then defined
as the first principal component of the jump in the futures rate of all 6 maturities. This
approach has several advantages over just considering a single maturity. First, this approach
minimizes the effect of noise in a specific maturity. Second, as policy decisions are persistent
over time, a policy change in the current period will also affect the futures rate several
periods ahead. Hence taking into account longer maturities might reveal information of
the persistence of the shock. This is important as persistent shocks should have a greater
impact on economic activity. It should be noted that financial market based identification
schemes of monetary policy shocks, like the one used here, assume that financial market
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participants beliefs about the Fed’s information set prior to the announcement of monetary
policy actions are correct, i.e. that unexpected changes11 in the federal funds rate are indeed
due to monetary policy shocks, and not due to superior information of the Fed. To assess this
assumption, Barakchian and Crowe (2013) regress their monetary policy shock measure on
the difference between the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts and high-quality private sector (Blue
Chip) forecasts for the 17 variables used in Romer and Romer (2004), where this difference
in forecasts is used as a proxy for the Fed’s internal information. They find little evidence of
superior information of the Fed compared to financial market participants12. This suggests
that the shock measure used here should be relatively uncorrelated with the Fed’s exclusive
information, and superior information on the side of the Fed should therefore not be a
significant problem. In Section 1.7, I consider a different identification scheme of monetary
policy shocks that explicitly controls for the Fed’s information set in the identification of
monetary policy shocks and find very similar results as in the baseline analysis using the
shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
The shock series is available from December 1988 onwards at monthly frequency. By
construction, the policy shock has mean zero and a standard deviation of one. A detailed
overview over the identification of monetary policy shocks can be found in Ramey (2016).
The data used here can be downloaded from the website of Valerie Ramey, available at
http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research.html#data. A graph depicting the time
series of the shock measure can be found in the Appendix in Figure A.2.
1.3 Aggregate Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
Before turning to the reaction of different industries to monetary policy shocks, I estimate
the reaction of (aggregate) industrial production (and other aggregate variables) to monetary
policy shocks in this Section. To estimate the dynamic effects of the identified policy shocks
on aggregate variables, I include the cumulated identified shock measure in a VAR. This
approach is similar to Romer and Romer (2004) and common in the empirical literature
on monetary policy transmission (Ramey (2016)). The specification of the VAR follows
Coibion (2012) and includes the same set of variables used in Coibion (2012). The variables
included are Industrial Production (in logs), the unemployment rate, the CPI (in logs), a
11Unexpected from the viewpoint of financial market participants
12The joint hypothesis of zero coefficients on all 17 variables cannot be rejected at the 10% level.
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commodity price index13 (in logs) (all seasonally adjusted) and the cumulated shock series.
The VAR is estimated at monthly frequency from December 1988 to December 2007.14 The
VAR includes 12 lags and a constant.
Following the literature on monetary policy shocks in structural VARs, the recursive
identification scheme of Christiano et al. (1999) is employed. Monetary policy is assumed
to respond to, but not affect, the other variables contemporaneously. The specification
used here employs the measure of policy shocks of Barakchian and Crowe (2013), whereas
Christiano et al. (1999) use the actual funds rate. Since standard VARs enter the federal
funds rate in levels, the shock series is cumulated to produce a comparable series. The
same estimation procedure (with a different measure of policy shocks) is used in e.g. Romer
and Romer (2004) or Coibion (2012). Similar specifications are commonly used in the
literature (see Ramey (2016) for a detailed review). It should be noted that the recursiveness
assumption is not necessary for identification of monetary policy shocks in the analysis at
hand, as an identified shock series is used. In order to be comparable with the previous
literature, in the baseline analysis the recursiveness assumption is used. The recursiveness
assumption is relaxed in Section 1.7.
13Taken from Valerie Rameys website described above.
14I end the sample in December 2007 to abstract from issues related to the Zero Lower Bound.
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Figure 1.1: Response of Industrial Production to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Structural VAR (Monthly data, 5 endogenous variables, 12 lags). Variables ordered as industrial
production (in logs), unemployment rate, consumer price index (in logs), commodity price index
(in logs) (all seasonally adjusted) and the cumulated shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe
(2013). The graph shows response of industrial production to a one standard deviation increase in
the policy measure. Structural shocks obtained via Cholesky decomposition. Bootstrapped 90%
Confidence Intervals based on 5000 Bootstrap Replications are shown in red.
Figure 1.1 shows the (cumulative) response of the aggregate industrial production index
to a one standard deviation increase in the policy measure (in percent). After a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the policy measure, industrial production drops by around 0.38%
2 years after the shock has occurred. Qualitatively, the sign and the speed of the reaction
are in line with other estimates found in the literature, e.g. Coibion (2012), Romer and
Romer (2004) and Ramey (2016). The timing of the response is very similar to Barakchian
and Crowe (2013), who use a different specification for their VAR. The size of the response
is slightly larger than the estimated response in Barakchian and Crowe (2013) (whose spec-
ification implies a drop in output of around 0.3% 2 years after a one standard deviation
contractionary shock). The size of the reaction is also comparable to other studies that
use financial market based measures of monetary policy shocks. For example, Gertler and
Karadi (2015) report a drop in industrial production of around 0.4% two years after a one
standard deviation increase in their policy instrument. Also the timing of the response in
Gertler and Karadi (2015) is very similar to the results reported here.
As the main focus of this of this study is the output response of different industries, the
reactions of the other variables are relegated to Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
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1.4 The Industry Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
This Section describes the output responses of the 205 industries to the identified mon-
etary policy shocks. First, the econometric specification is discussed. Then, the results of
the estimation are presented.
1.4.1 Econometric Specification
To estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on the output of a particular industry
i, the (log) output (seasonally adjusted) of industry i is added to the VAR described in the
Section 1.3 as additional (sixth) variable.
Several additional identifying restrictions are imposed on the VAR, compared to the VAR
in Section 1.3. The purpose of these restrictions is to ensure that the sequence of monetary
policy shocks is the same for all industries i.
Let Yt,i = [IPt, UNEMPt, CPIt, PCOMt, CSHOCKt, OUTt,i]
′ denote the variables in-
cluded in the VAR for industry i. The first five variables are the same as described in the
previous Section and OUTi,t denotes the log of the industrial production index of industry
i.
Denote the reduced-form VAR for industry i as15
Yt,i =
P∑
p=1
Φp,iYt−p,i + et,i (1.5)
where Φp,i are the reduced-form VAR coefficients (with P = 12 in the specification used
here) and et,i denoting the mean zero reduced-form VAR residuals with variance-covariance
matrix E(et,ie
′
t,i) = Ωi.
In order to ensure that the sequence of (aggregate) shocks is the same for each industry
i, several restrictions are imposed.
Assume that the structural form of the model for every industry i is given by
Ai(L)Yt,i = vt,i (1.6)
where Ai(L) = A0,i−A1,iL− . . .−AP,iLP is a (invertible) lag polynomial of order P and
15The constant c is omitted here, i.e. the data is demeaned.
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L denotes the lag operator. The mutually uncorrelated structural innovations are denoted
by vt,i with diagonal variance-covariance matrix Σi.
The goal of the following restrictions is to identify the reaction to the fifth element of
the vector of structural shocks vt,i, which is the innovation to the policy measure. Other
structural shocks ordered before the policy variable are left unspecified (but common to all
industries).
The relation between the structural parameters and the reduced-form coefficients is hence
given by:
Φp,i = A
−1
0,iAp,i (1.7)
Ωi = A
−1
0,iΣi(A
−1
0,i )
T (1.8)
In line with the recursiveness assumption made in the previous section, the matrix A0,i
is assumed to be lower triangular with an additional zero restriction:
A0,i =

∗ 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗

(1.9)
where ∗ denotes an unrestricted coefficient. In economic terms, these restrictions imply
the same recursiveness assumption that was invoked in the preceding section: Monetary
policy shocks (ordered fifth) have no contemporaneous impact on all other variables in the
system, including the output of industry i. The additional zero in the fifth column in the
last row of matrix A0,i ensures that policy shocks have no contemporaneous impact on the
output of industry i.
Additionally, the following restrictions are imposed on the structural VAR parameters
for p 6= 0:
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Ap,i =

∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗

(1.10)
Under these restrictions, the reduced-form parameter matrices Φp,i have zeros in the
same place as the structural VAR parameter matrices Ap,i, the system has a block recursive
structure. First, an aggregate block, containing the five aggregate variables, whose dynamics
are the same for every industry i, and the same as the VAR described in Section 1.3. Second,
an industry-specific block, whose coefficients are different for every industry i, which contains
the output of industry i as only variable. It should be noted that these restrictions imply
that sector-specific movements in industry i’s output are constrained to affect the variables
in the common subsystem (the aggregate variables) in proportion to the sector’s share of
total industrial production16.
Imposing the structural restrictions described here ensures that the sequence of monetary
policy shocks (and of the other, unspecified, common shocks) is the same for all industries
i, and equal to the sequence of policy shocks in the estimation without industry i. Similar
restrictions are imposed in Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), who refer to this set-up as ”near-
VAR”. In fact, the whole system can be described as a restricted panel VAR, with a common
block of macroeconomic variables and an industry-specific block (which here contains a
single variable, industry i’s output). One appealing feature of this estimation is that it
allows sectoral responses to monetary policy shocks to vary freely, while keeping the same
sequence of policy shocks and dynamics of aggregate variables for every industry i.
16i.e. the feedback of industry i’s output, OUTt,i, on total industrial production IPt and the other
aggregate variables is not explicitly estimated, but the coefficients on (lagged) values of OUTt,i for the
aggregate variables are constrained to be zero. However, movements in the output of industry i still have
an effect on the aggregate system, due to the fact that total industrial production IPt is a (weighted) sum
of the output of all industries i.
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1.4.2 Results
The panel VAR described in Section 1.4.1 is estimated at monthly frequency using data
from the period of December 1988 to December 2007. The VAR includes 12 lags and a
constant, similar to the specification of the aggregate VAR described in Section 1.3.
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the dynamic output responses of the 205 industries
to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock. The red line shows the
median of the (cross-sectional) output responses (in percent) of the 205 industries at each
horizon after the shock. The blue lines show the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution
of responses at each horizon after the shock, respectively. The green lines show the fifth and
95th percentile of the distribution of responses at each horizon.
Figure 1.2: Industry Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
This Figure shows the distribution of output responses of the 205 different industries to a one
standard deviation contractionary policy shock identified as in Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
Structural shocks are identified via Cholesky decomposition. Policy shocks and aggregate dynamics
are common across industries. The red line shows the median response of all industries at each
horizon. The blue lines show the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution of the industries
output responses at each horizon. The green lines show the fifth and 95th percentile of the
distribution of the industries output responses at each horizon.
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The median response of industries (red) tracks the response of aggregate industrial pro-
duction well: 2 years after the shock has happened, the median industries output has fallen
by around 0.4%. However, there is substantial heterogeneity present in the industries output
responses. The interquartile range of responses is about 0.9% 2 years after the shock17.
For some industries the fall in output is as large as 2% two years after the shock, i.e.
around 5 times as large as the drop in total output. On the other hand, around 25%
of industries even experience an increase in output in response to a contractionary policy
shock. The fact that a substantial share of industries increase their output in response
to contractionary monetary policy shocks deserves mentioning. In the multi-sector New
Keynesian models of Ghassibe (2018) and Bouakez et al. (2013), sectoral output responses
are all negative in response to contractionary monetary shocks. In an extension of his model,
Ghassibe (2018) shows that positive output reactions to a contractionary policy shock are
only possible under an elasticity of substitution between sectors that is greater than one.
The fact that a non-negligible share of sectors increases output after a contractionary policy
shock is hence not consistent with the most basic versions of multi-sector New Keynesian
models. In the multi-sector menu cost model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), several
industries experience a drop in output in response a positive nominal demand shock18, which
is consistent with the empirical reactions presented here.
This result shows that there is indeed substantial heterogeneity in the output responses
of industries to monetary policy shocks. A natural question to ask is which industry charac-
teristics determine these differential reactions. The following Section investigates the role of
heterogeneity in price stickiness across industries in determining these differential reactions.
17The difference between the 25 percentile and the 75 percentile of responses, which corresponds to the
distance between the blue lines in Figure 1.2.
18which is the equivalent of monetary policy shocks in their model
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1.5 The Role of Price Stickiness in Explaining Indus-
try Output Reactions to Monetary Policy Shocks
The building blocks of New Keynesian Macroeconomics imply that the observed het-
erogeneity in the output responses to monetary policy shocks across industries should be
systematically related to the degree of price stickiness of these industries. Industries with
a higher degree of price stickiness should systematically react more strongly to monetary
policy shocks (ceteris paribus). This prediction is made by various multi-sector New Keyne-
sian models, for example Bouakez et al. (2013) and Ghassibe (2018), but can also arise from
multi-sector menu cost models like for example Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). Testing
this prediction does not only speak to multi-sector New Keynesian models, but more gen-
erally to New Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism. New Keynesian
models greatly emphasize the role of nominal rigidities, in particular price stickiness, for
the monetary transmission mechanism and the real effects of monetary policy (Gal´ı (2015)).
Hence the test whether price stickiness has a role in explaining differential industry reac-
tions is an important test of the New Keynesian paradigm. This Section asses whether this
proposed ”price stickiness channel” is supported by the data.
To asses the correlation between price stickiness and the strength of the response to
monetary policy shocks, I run the following regression:
IRF hi = α
h + βhlog(FPAi) + e
h
i (1.11)
where IRF hi is the output response of industry i to an unexpected one standard deviation
increase in the policy measure h months after the shock (measured in percent) and FPAi is
the monthly frequency of price adjustment of industry i. The frequency of price adjustment
enters in logs rather than in levels to estimate the (semi) elasticity of the frequency of price
adjustment.19
Note that a higher frequency of price adjustment means that prices are less sticky. The
results of this regression for different horizons (18, 24 and 30 months) after the monetary
policy shock can be found in Table 1.1. I focus on these horizons to be comparable with the
19All results are robust to using the frequency of price adjustment in levels rather than logs as independent
variable in the regression. The choice of using FPA in logs rather than levels is also motivated by the fact
that, as can bee seen in Figure A.1 in the Appendix, the distribution of the frequency of price adjustment
is very skewed to the right, whereas the distribution of the logged frequency of price adjustment is more
symmetrical.
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previous literature on sectoral differences in the monetary policy transmission mechanism,
e.g. Dedola and Lippi (2005), and as the peak response of aggregate industrial production is
reached between these horizons. Table 1.1 also reports the reaction of the (total) industrial
production index h months after the shock.
It should be noted that the coefficient βh here should not be interpreted as a causal
effect, as price stickiness is not randomly assigned. βh could only be interpreted as a causal
effect if one assumes that there are no other factors that affect both, an industries reaction
to monetary policy shocks, and this industries degree of price stickiness. In Section 1.6 I
investigate how the estimated coefficient on the frequency of price adjustment changes once
additional industry characteristics are added to the regression.
Table 1.1: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses
(1) (2) (3)
h = 18 Months h = 24 Months h = 30 Months
Log(FPA) 0.223 0.341** 0.339**
(0.143) (0.147) (0.136)
Observations 205 205 205
R-squared 0.015 0.031 0.034
¯IRF
h
-0.286 -0.383 -0.416
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the coefficient on log(FPA) estimated in Equation 1.11 at different horizons h.
The regression also includes a constant (not reported). ¯IRF
h
denotes the response of the (total)
industrial production index h months after an unexpected one standard deviation increase in the
policy measure. Robust Standard Errors are reported in Parenthesis.
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The scatter plot underlying the regression for h = 24 can be found in the Appendix in
Figure A.4. For the horizons h = 24 and h = 30 months after the monetary policy shock,
there is a statistically significant association between the strength of the response to policy
shocks and the degree of price stickiness.
Qualitatively, the sign of the coefficient on the FPA is consistent with the predictions
made by New Keynesian models. In response to the monetary policy shock, there is a
drop in (total) industrial production (e.g. by 0.38% for h = 24 months). The positive sign
on the regression coefficient means that, on average, industries with a higher frequency of
price adjustment, i.e. more flexible prices, experience a less negative drop in output. This
reaction is qualitatively in line with the prediction of (Multi-Sector) New Keynesian models:
Industries with more flexible prices should react less strongly to monetary policy surprises.
The positive sign on the coefficient shows that this is indeed the case: The magnitude of
the reaction to policy shocks is lower for flexible price industries.
Quantitatively, the size of the coefficient is also economically significant. Consider the
horizon of h = 24 months after the policy shock. A 10% increase in the frequency of price
adjustment is associated with a 0.034 percentage point increase in the cumulative output
response to the shock. Compared to the drop in the (total) industrial production index
at the same horizon, which is 0.38, the size of this effect is economically meaningful: a
10% increase in the frequency of price adjustment leads to a less negative output response
to the policy shock that is (approximately) as large as 10% of the total drop in output.
The implied differential reaction between the most sticky price industries and the most
flexible price industries is large. The tenth percentile of the in-sample frequency of price
adjustment is given by 11.52 (meaning that on average 11.52% of prices are changed per
month), implying a log(FPA) of 2.44. The 90th percentile of the in-sample frequency of price
adjustment is given by 41.68, implying a log(FPA) of 3.73. The regression coefficient for
the horizon of h = 24 months implies that the drop in output is 0.341× (3.73−2.44) = 0.44
percentage points larger for industries at the tenth percentile of the in-sample frequency of
price adjustment compared to industries at the 90th percentile of the in-sample frequency
of price adjustment. Compared to the drop in total industrial production, which is 0.38
percentage points at the same horizon, this implied differential reaction is sizable.
The relative size of the effect is similar for the horizon of h = 30 months. For the horizon
of h = 18 months, the sign and relative size of the coefficient are comparable to the other
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two horizons considered, but the coefficient is (marginally) insignificant (the p-value based
on robust standard errors is p = 0.12).
Figure 1.3 shows the coefficient on log(FPA) estimated from Equation 1.11 for all horizons
from h = 0 up to h = 48. Additionally, Figure 1.3 shows the inverted impulse-response
function of total industrial production (i.e. the IRF is multiplied with (-1)). This Figure
shows that for the first year after the shock there is no differential reaction between sticky
and flexible price industries. However, when total industrial production starts to fall (around
1 year after the shock), the drop is stronger for sticky price industries than it is for flexible
price industries. In fact, the coefficient on log(FPA) moves very much in parallel with the
IRF of total industrial production (starting from h = 12 months after the shock), differences
between sticky and flexible price industries coincide with the drop in aggregate output and
do not seem to be driven by differences in the speed of the reaction.
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Figure 1.3: Regression Coefficient on log(FPA) for different Horizons h
This Figure shows the time series of the estimated coefficient on log(FPA) from Equation 1.11 for
all horizons from h = 0 up to h = 48 months after a contractionary policy shock. The blue line
shows the estimated coefficient on log(FPA) at each horizon h. The gray lines are 95% confidence
bands of the coefficient based on robust standard errors. The red, dashed line shows the inverted
reaction of total Industrial Production in response to the policy shock in percent (i.e. the IRF is
multiplied with (-1)).
1.6 Adding Further Industry Characteristics
The analysis so far has focused on differences in the frequency of price adjustment as
source of heterogeneity in output responses between industries. However, the frequency of
price adjustment is not the only (potential) factor determining an industries reaction to
monetary policy shocks. For example, more cyclical industries exhibit a higher frequency of
price adjustment (Klenow and Malin (2010)). At the same time, cyclical industries might
exhibit a larger drop in output following a contractionary monetary policy shock, as they
react more strongly to swings in economic activity. Not controlling for the cyclicality of an
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industry could hence lead to omitted variable bias in the estimated relationship between
the frequency of price adjustment and the reaction to monetary policy shocks20.
The goal of this Section is to assess to what extent the result established in the previous
Section is affected by other (so far omitted) industry-level characteristics. To asses this
further industry-level characteristics are added as additional control variables to Regression
1.11. The goal of this approach is to disentangle the role of the frequency of price adjust-
ment from other potentially confounding factors in the monetary transmission mechanism.
Regression 1.11 is hence changed to:
IRF hi = α
h + βhlog(FPAi) + γ
hXi + e
h
i (1.12)
where Xi denotes the additional industry-level control variables that will be added in this
Section. Additional industry-level control variables Xi are added to the regression in order
to test the robustness of the main result established in the Section 1.5. It should be noted
that the goal of this analysis is not to explicitly test for the importance of other industry
characteristics for the transmission of monetary policy, like e.g. the analysis of Peersman
and Smets (2005) or Dedola and Lippi (2005). Hence the sign and size of the coefficients
on the other industry-level control variables considered in this Section are not discussed in
detail.
Before presenting the results of this exercise, I present an overview over the additional
control variables included in Equation 1.12. The inclusion of the control variables is moti-
vated either by the fact that an explicit link between the control variable and the frequency
of price adjustment has been suggested, or by the fact that the variable has been found to
be a significant determinant of industry-level responses to monetary policy shocks in the
previous literature21.
The full list of additional control variables is reported in Table 1.2. Whenever possible,
variables are calculated as industry averages over the same time period that is used in
Section 1.3 and 1.4. Summary statistics for the variables can be found in the Appendix in
Table A.2. Additional details on the calculation of the variables can be found in Section
A.1 in the Appendix.
20In this specific example, failing to control for industry cyclicality should attenuate the coefficient on
FPA towards zero.
21Even if an additional control variable should be orthogonal to the frequency of price adjustment, but
influences an industries reaction to monetary policy shocks, the inclusion of this control variable will help
to obtain more precise estimates of the effect of the frequency of price adjustment.
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Table 1.2: Additional Control Variables and Data Sources
Variable Source & Time Period Frequency
Inventory over Sales NBER-CES: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Labor Cost over Sales NBER-CES: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Capital Intensity NBER-CES: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Average Firm Size (Number of Employees) Economic Census 2007 Yearly
Interest Rate Burden Compustat: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Leverage Ratio Compustat: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Short-Term Debt Ratio Compustat: 1988 - 2007 Yearly
Standard Dev. of Output Growth Ind. Prod. Data: 1988 - 2007 Monthly
Cyclicality Ind. Prod. Data: 1988 - 2007 Monthly
Durable Goods Dummy BLS Fixed
This Table presents an overview of the additional industry-level control variables considered in
this Section.
The data sources used to calculate the additional control variables are the NBER-CES
manufacturing database (denoted by NBER-CES in Table 1.2), the Compustat North Amer-
ica Fundamentals Annual database (denoted by Compustat in Table 1.2), the industrial
production data form the Fed Board of Governors (described in Section 1.2, denoted by
Ind. Prod. Data in Table 1.2) and the Durable Goods Producer definition of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (denoted by BLS in Table 1.2). In the following, the variables presented in
Table 1.2 are explained in detail.
Inventory over Sales & Labor Cost over Sales: Industry-level differences in the reaction
to monetary policy shocks might be driven by industry-level differences in the dependence on
external funding (following Bernanke et al. (1999)). At the same time, Balleer et al. (2017)
document a link between financial constraints and the frequency of price adjustment at the
firm level (using German survey data). To control for this potential link of external financial
dependence and the frequency of price adjustment, the external financial dependence of an
industry is added as additional control variable. Following Raddatz (2006), two measures
of external financial dependence are calculated: The industry-level ratio of inventories over
sales and the industry-level ratio of labor costs over sales. Industries with higher ratios can
finance less of ongoing costs through revenues and hence might dependent more on external
financing. Both measures are calculated from the NBER-CES manufacturing database.
Capital Intensity: More capital-intensive industries are expected to be more sensitive
to changes in the user cost of capital, which itself will depend on changes in interest rates
(Peersman and Smets (2005) and Bouakez et al. (2013)). To control for this cost of capital
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channel, an industry’s capital intensity is added as additional control variable. Following
Peersman and Smets (2005), capital intensity is calculated as the ratio of capital expen-
ditures over sales, using data from the NBER-CES manufacturing database over the time
period 1988 to 2007.
Average Firm Size: Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) argue that small firms are more strongly
affected by financial frictions than large firms and hence small firms are affected more
strongly by monetary policy shocks than large firms. At the same time, large firms exhibit
a higher frequency of price adjustment (Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009)). To control for
industry-level differences in firm size, average firm size is added as additional control vari-
able22. Average firm size is measured as the average number of employees per firm at the
industry-level, calculated from the Economic Census 2007.
Interest-Rate Burden: Following Dedola and Lippi (2005), industries with higher interest
rate expenses should be more exposed to changes in the interest rate. These industries
should experience larger changes in costs following changes in interest rates. To control
for this interest rate expense channel, the interest burden is added as additional control
variable. The interest burden is calculated as the ratio of interest expenses over sales, using
Compustat data from 1988 to 2007.
Leverage Ratio: D’Acunto et al. (2018) show that flexible price firms, on average, have
a higher leverage ratio than sticky price firms. At the same time, Ottonello and Winberry
(2018) show that at the firm level low leverage is associated with stronger (investment)
responses to monetary policy shocks. In order to control for industry-level differences in
leverage, I add industry-level leverage as additional control variable. Leverage is calculated
as the ratio of total debt over total assets using Compustat data from 1988 to 2007.
Short-Term Debt Ratio: Industries with a larger share of short-term debt should be more
exposed to changes in interest rates than industries with longer debt maturities, as they need
to refinance debt more often. Hence industries with a larger share of short-term debt should
experience a relatively larger change in the user cost of capital following changes in the
interest rate. Following Dedola and Lippi (2005), the ratio of short-term debt over total
assets is added as additional control variables. This variable is calculated using Compustat
data from 1988 to 2007.
Standard Deviation of Output Growth: The size and frequency of idiosyncratic shocks
22This variable enters regression 1.12 in logs, rather than in levels.
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might differ along industries as well. Industries facing more volatile idiosyncratic shocks
might adjust prices more often, stay closer to their optimal price level and hence react
less severely to monetary shocks (see e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010)). Following
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) the standard deviation of (monthly) output growth is
added as additional control variable to control for the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. The
standard deviation of output growth is calculated using the industry-level production data
described in Section 1.2, over the time period December 1988 to December 2007.
Cyclicality: A further factor that might confound the effect of the frequency of price
adjustment is the cyclicality of an industry (as noted in the beginning of this Section).
When a contractionary policy shock causes economic activity to drop, more cyclical in-
dustries might experience a larger drop in output. At the same time, cyclical industries
change prices more often (Klenow and Malin (2010)). To control for the cyclicality of an
industry, the coefficient on total output growth estimated from a regression of (demeaned)
monthly industry-level output growth on (demeaned) monthly total output growth is added
as additional control variable. This coefficient is calculated using the monthly industrial
production data described in Section 1.2 over the time period from 1988 to 2007.
Durable Goods Producers: Lastly, following Dedola and Lippi (2005), a dummy variable
for industries producing durable goods is added, as durable goods producers might face
more cyclical and more interest-rate sensitive demand.
I control for the additional variables described here in two separate ways. First, I report
the results of a regression that includes only one of the control variables in addition to the
frequency of price adjustment (and no other control variables), separately for every control
variable. Furthermore, I estimate Equation 1.12 including all additional control variables
jointly.
Table 1.3 and 1.4 shows the result for each of the regressions for the timing of h = 24
months after the shock.
32
Table 1.3: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(FPA) 0.545*** 0.534** 0.471*** 0.377** 0.348** 0.336**
(0.181) (0.228) (0.172) (0.164) (0.149) (0.146)
Inventory/Sales 2.374***
(0.795)
Labor Costs/Sales 1.070
(1.464)
Capital Intensity -5.554
(4.534)
Firm Size -0.0595
(0.0767)
Interest Expense Ratio -1.489
(1.853)
Leverage 0.227
(0.598)
Observations 187 187 187 202 204 204
R-squared 0.060 0.044 0.047 0.033 0.034 0.032
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the estimation results when estimating Equation 1.12 at a horizon of h = 24
months, including the additional control variables described in the text one at a time.
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Table 1.4: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Additional Controls Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(FPA) 0.337** 0.319** 0.356** 0.257* 0.612***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.150) (0.154) (0.235)
Inventory/Sales 2.880***
(0.841)
Labor Costs/Sales 2.410
(1.777)
Capital Intensity -6.844
(4.306)
Firm Size 0.0434
(0.0804)
Interest Expense Ratio -3.058
(2.307)
Leverage 1.283*
(0.748)
Short-Term Debt Ratio -1.591 -2.096
(1.690) (2.013)
Cyclicality -0.161** -0.269***
(0.0677) (0.0813)
Std(Output Growth) -0.0215 0.0416
(0.0321) (0.0499)
Durability -0.245* -0.243
(0.138) (0.175)
Observations 204 205 205 205 186
R-squared 0.034 0.055 0.033 0.045 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the estimation results when estimating Equation 1.12 at a horizon of h = 24
months, including the additional control variables described in the text one at a time. In the last
column all control variables described in the text are included jointly.
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Table 1.3 and 1.4 show that the main finding established in Section 1.5 is not only robust
to the inclusion of further industry characteristics, but the estimated coefficient on the
frequency of price adjustment becomes even larger in most cases. When controlling for all
other control variables jointly (Column 5 in Table 1.4), the coefficient on the frequency of
price adjustment becomes nearly twice as large compared to the case when no other control
variables are used (0.612 when including all other control variables vs 0.341 when no other
control variables are used).
Table 1.5 shows that this is also the case for the horizons of h = 18 months and h = 30
months after the shock. Table 1.5 reports the results of Equation 1.12 when all other control
variables are included jointly for the horizons of h = 18 months and h = 30 months. Similar
to the case of h = 24 months after the shock, the coefficient on the frequency of price
adjustment is now substantially larger than before (0.496 when including all other control
variables vs 0.223 when no other control variables are included for the horizon h = 18
months after the shock, and 0.548 when including all other control variables vs 0.339 when
no other control variables are included for the horizon h = 30 months after the shock).
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Table 1.5: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Additional Controls at Different
Horizons
(1) (2)
h = 18 Months h = 30 Months
Log(FPA) 0.496** 0.548**
(0.242) (0.226)
Inventory/Sales 2.557*** 2.340***
(0.806) (0.881)
Labor Costs/Sales 2.532 2.242
(1.584) (1.828)
Capital Int. -5.785 -7.000
(3.980) (4.792)
Firm Size 0.0597 0.0606
(0.0770) (0.0788)
Interest Expense Ratio -2.975* -3.515
(1.754) (2.476)
Leverage 0.627 1.469**
(0.711) (0.741)
Short-Term Debt Ratio -1.245 -2.419
(1.824) (2.008)
Cyclicality -0.199*** -0.283***
(0.0751) (0.0796)
Std(Output Growth) 0.0144 0.0679
(0.0478) (0.0452)
Durability -0.227 -0.167
(0.161) (0.175)
Observations 186 186
R-squared 0.112 0.152
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the estimation results when estimating Equation 1.12 at horizons h = 18 months
(column (1)) and h = 30 months (column (2)), respectively. All control variables described in the
text are included jointly.
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The results presented in this Section provides further support for the hypothesis that
sticky price industries react more strongly to monetary policy shocks than flexible price
industries. The results reported in Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 show that the differential output
reactions in response to monetary policy shocks between sticky- and flexible-price industries
established in Section 1.5 is not spuriously caused by omitted variable bias induced by a
wide range of other industry characteristics controlled for in this Section. This finding is
consistent with the prediction made by (multi-sector) New Keynesian models and suggests
that sticky prices indeed play an important role in the monetary transmission mechanism.
The results reported here alleviate concerns that the (cross-industry) correlation between
the output response to monetary policy shocks and the frequency of price adjustment is
spuriously caused by other industry characteristics. In fact, the findings reported in Tables
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 rather suggest the opposite: when not controlling for the additional industry-
level characteristics considered in this Section (as in Equation 1.11), the correlation between
the output response and the frequency of price adjustment is attenuated towards zero.
Qualitatively, the result is unchanged compared to Section 1.5 - Industries with more
sticky prices react more strongly to monetary policy shocks. Quantitatively, the results re-
ported here suggest that the differential reaction between sticky and flexible price industries
is even stronger as suggested by the results reported in Section 1.5.
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1.7 Robustness
This Section further investigates the robustness of the results in two respects. First, I
consider the robustness of the results with respect to the minimum delay restriction (i.e.
the restriction that monetary shocks have no effect on industrial production on impact)
imposed in the baseline estimation scheme. Furthermore, I consider the robustness of the
results with respect to the identification of monetary policy shocks. To asses the robustness
of the results in this dimension, I repeat the analysis using the identification scheme for
monetary policy shocks of Miranda-Agrippino (2016).
As one robustness check, I relax the minimum delay restriction imposed in the baseline
estimation scheme described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. In this robustness check, I allow for
an immediate effect of monetary policy shocks on the other variables in the system (most
importantly on aggregate and sectoral industrial production). This is achieved by ordering
the monetary policy shock as first variable in the VAR, allowing for an immediate reaction
of all other variables23. To allow for an immediate reaction of (sectoral) output of industry
i, matrix A0,i is changed to:
A0,i =

∗ 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗

(1.13)
which allows for an immediate reaction of industry i’s output to a policy shock (and for an
immediate reaction of (aggregate) industrial production in response to a monetary policy
shock). In the following, I will refer to this robustness check as ’Alternative Ordering’.
As further robustness check, I repeat the analysis using the monetary policy shock series
of Miranda-Agrippino (2016). The identification scheme of Miranda-Agrippino (2016) is a
hybrid approach of identifying monetary policy shocks, combining market-based measures
of monetary policy shocks (like Barakchian and Crowe (2013) used above, or e.g. Gu¨rkaynak
et al. (2005)) and the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2004). One concern with
23In terms of the notation used before, Yt,i is now given by Yt,i =
[CSHOCKt, IPt, UNEMPt, CPIt, PCOMt, OUTt,i]
T
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the financial market based identification approach of monetary shocks used in the baseline
analysis is that the central bank might have superior information compared to financial mar-
ket participants (as noted in Section 1.2). If this is the case, monetary policy decisions that
are surprising to financial market participants might not be pure monetary shocks, but also
convey new information to agents in the economy (see e.g. Jarocinski and Karadi (2018)).
To control for this information effect, Miranda-Agrippino (2016) constructs a financial mar-
ket based measure of monetary policy shocks that explicitly controls for the information set
of the central bank. This approach combines the high-frequency identification of monetary
policy shocks of Gertler and Karadi (2015) with the narrative identification of Romer and
Romer (2004). Monetary policy shocks in Miranda-Agrippino (2016) are constructed as the
residual of a regression of the high-frequency monetary policy shocks of Gertler and Karadi
(2015) on the Fed Greenbook Forecast variables used by Romer and Romer (2004)24. In
the robustness check using this identification of monetary policy shocks, the estimation of
(aggregate and industry-specific) responses to monetary shocks is carried out as described
in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4, replacing the shock series of Barakchian and Crowe (2013)
with the shock series of Miranda-Agrippino (2016). In the following, I will refer to this
robustness check as ’Alternative Shock Identification’.
24The monetary policy shock series constructed this way can be downloaded from the webpage of Silvia
Miranda-Aggripino, avaiable at http://silviamirandaagrippino.com/code-data.
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Figure 1.4: Response of Industrial Production to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock -
Robustness Checks
(a) Alternative Ordering (b) Alternative Shock Identification
These Figures show the response of (aggregate) industrial production to a one standard devia-
tion contractionary policy shock. The left Panel shows the results when the shock measure of
Barakchian and Crowe (2013), but no minimum delay restriction is used. The right Panel shows
the estimation results when the shock measure of Miranda-Agrippino (2016) is used. In both
Panels, the blue line shows the point estimate of the IRF. The red, dashed lines show the 90%
Confidence Interval based on 5000 Bootstrap replications.
Figure 1.4 depicts the estimated response of (aggregate) industrial production to a one
standard deviation contractionary policy shock estimated in both robustness checks. The
estimated responses of the other aggregate variables in the two robustness checks can be
found in the Appendix in Figure A.5 (alternative ordering) and Figure A.6 (alternative
shock identification), respectively. Relaxing the minimum delay restriction has barely any
impact on the estimated response of industrial production, compared to the baseline esti-
mation scheme. Regarding the estimation using the shock measure of Miranda-Agrippino
(2016), two things are noteworthy. First, the peak response of industrial production to a
contractionary monetary policy shock is reached faster (after approximately 15 months),
compared to when the shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe (2013) is used. Second,
the magnitude of the peak drop in (aggregate) industrial production in response to a con-
tractionary shock is (comparatively) smaller. The estimated peak in the drop in industrial
production in response to a one standard deviation contractionary shock is around 0.25%
in this robustness check, smaller than the drop of 0.38% found when using the monetary
shock series of Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
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Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of sectoral (output) responses to a one standard devi-
ation contractionary monetary policy shock estimated in both robustness checks described
here. The left Panel in Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of estimated industry output re-
sponses when using monetary policy shocks identified as in Barakchian and Crowe (2013)
and not imposing a minimum delay restriction. The right Panel in Figure 1.5 shows the
distribution of estimated industry output responses when using monetary policy shocks
identified as in Miranda-Agrippino (2016) and the baseline estimation scheme described in
Section 1.4 is used.
Figure 1.5: Industry Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock - Robustness Checks
(a) Alternative Ordering (b) Alternative Shock Identification
These Figures show the output response of the 205 different industries to a one standard devi-
ation contractionary policy shock. The left Panel shows the results when the shock measure of
Barakchian and Crowe (2013), but no minimum delay restriction is used. The right Panel shows
the estimation results when the shock measure of Miranda-Agrippino (2016) is used. In both
Panels, the red line shows the median response of all industries at each horizon. The blue lines
show the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution of the industries output responses at each
horizon. The green lines show the fifth and 95th percentile of the distribution of the industries
output responses at each horizon.
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Figure 1.5 shows that in both cases there is substantial heterogeneity present in the out-
put response across industries. As before, roughly 25% of industries experience an increase
in output in response to a contractionary policy shock in both robustness checks. When
identifying monetary policy shocks as in Miranda-Agrippino (2016), industry output re-
sponses are smaller in magnitude and the peak response is reached more quickly compared
to the results when using the shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe (2013), mirroring
to the difference in the estimated reaction of aggregate industrial production across both
estimation schemes described above. Otherwise, industry responses are very similar across
the different estimation schemes discussed here. The cross-sectional correlation of industry
responses between the baseline estimation in Section 1.4 and the two estimation schemes
presented here is ρ = 0.98 (alternative ordering) and ρ = 0.59 (different shock identification)
at a horizon of h = 24 months, respectively.
The regression results obtained in the two robustness checks when including no other
control variables (i.e. as described in Section 1.5) can be found in Table 1.6. Consistent
with the results reported in Section 1.5, I report the estimates using the cross-section of
industry responses h = 18, 24 and 30 months after a contractionary policy shock. Columns
labeled (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1.6 report the results of the alternative ordering robustness
check. Columns labeled (4), (5) and (6) in Table 1.6 report the results of the alternative
shock identification robustness check.
Table 1.6: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h = 18 h = 24 h = 30 h = 18 h = 24 h = 30
Log(FPA) 0.255* 0.364** 0.357** 0.573*** 0.361*** 0.0620
(0.152) (0.158) (0.147) (0.169) (0.106) (0.0780)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.017 0.030 0.033 0.131 0.066 0.002
¯IRF
h
-0.308 -0.404 - 0.433 -0.199 -0.087 - 0.061
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the coefficient on log(FPA) in regression 1.11 at different horizons h after the
shock. The constant term is not reported. Columns labeled (1), (2) and (3) report the results
of the alternative ordering robustness check. Columns labeled (4), (5) and (6) report the results
of the alternative shock identification robustness check. ¯IRF
h
denotes the response of the (total)
industrial production index h months after an unexpected one standard deviation increase in the
policy measure, estimated in the same robustness check. Robust standard errors are reported in
Parenthesis.
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The results obtained in the alternative ordering robustness check (reported in the Columns
labeled (1), (2) and (3) of Table 1.6) are nearly identical to the baseline results reported
in Table 1.1. The results obtained when identifying monetary policy shocks as in Miranda-
Agrippino (2016) (reported in the Columns labeled (4), (5) and (6) in Table 1.6) suggest a
stronger association between the frequency of price adjustment and the output response to
monetary policy shocks, compared to the baseline results. In this robustness check, the esti-
mated coefficient on the frequency of price adjustment is larger, while the drop in industrial
production is smaller.25
Table 1.7: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Additional Controls in Robustness
Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h = 18 h = 24 h = 30 h = 18 h = 24 h = 30
Log(FPA) 0.547** 0.653*** 0.590** 0.717** 0.530*** 0.208*
(0.252) (0.250) (0.241) (0.306) (0.180) (0.120)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186
R-squared 0.115 0.149 0.155 0.203 0.131 0.100
Add. Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the coefficient on log(FPA) in regression 1.12 at different horizons h after the
shock. The constant term is not reported. Columns labeled (1), (2) and (3) report the results of
the alternative ordering robustness check. Columns labeled (4), (5) and (6) report the results of the
alternative shock identification robustness check. In all results the full set of industry-level control
variables described in Section 1.6 is included. Robust standard errors are reported in Parenthesis.
Table 1.7 reports the results obtained in the respective robustness checks when con-
25When comparing the results obtained in the different shock identification robustness check with the
baseline results, it should also be kept in mind that when using the identification scheme of Miranda-
Agrippino (2016), the peak in the drop of industrial production is reached faster. For the sake of comparing
the size of the coefficients obtained in this (alternative shock identification) robustness check to the baseline
results, it is also helpful to consider the standardized regression coefficient obtained from regression 1.11
(i.e. standardizing all variables to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one before estimating the
regression). The standardized regression coefficients obtained in the baseline results are βh=18 = .123 and
βh=24 = .175 for h = 18 and h = 24 months, respectively. The interpretation of e.g. βh=24 = .175 is that
a one standard deviation increase in the log of the frequency of price adjustment is associated with a 0.175
standard deviation increase in the output reaction to a contractionary monetary policy shock at a horizon
of 24 months after the shock (in the baseline results reported in Section 1.5). In the alternative shock
identification robustness check, the standardized regression coefficients are estimated at βh=18 = .361 and
βh=24 = .257 at the two horizons, respectively. Using this standardized measure, the (relative) size of the
association between the frequency of price adjustment and the output reaction to monetary policy shocks
is approximately twice as large in the alternative shock identification robustness check, compared to the
baseline result.
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trolling for all additional industry-level variables described in Section 1.6.26 These results
confirm the finding established in Section 1.6: When controlling for additional industry
characteristics, the correlation between the frequency of price adjustment and an industry’s
output response to monetary policy shocks becomes larger compared to the case where no
additional industry-level variables are considered.
Both robustness checks confirm a significant association between the frequency of price
adjustment and the output response to monetary policy shocks at the industry level. The
results obtained in the robustness checks suggest that the association between the frequency
of price adjustment and the output response to monetary policy shocks at the industry level
is rather under- than overestimated in the main specification. This alleviates concerns that
the established association is spuriously caused by the estimation method, the identification
of monetary policy shocks or by omitted industry characteristics. The results suggest that
sticky prices indeed play a central role the monetary transmission mechanism, consistent
with the predictions of (multi-sector) New Keynesian models.
1.8 Conclusion
Do sticky prices matter for the monetary transmission mechanism? This Chapter pro-
vides new evidence on this question by studying the role of price stickiness for the monetary
transmission mechanism using disaggregated industry-level data from 205 US manufactur-
ing industries. The output reactions of different industries to a (common) contractionary
monetary policy shock differ substantially. Two years after a one standard contractionary
monetary policy shock, (total) industrial production is estimated to drop by approximately
0.38%. Some industries experience a drop in output as large as 2%, while other industries
even increase output by 0.9% in reaction to the same shock, at the same horizon.
I show that an industry’s output response to monetary policy shocks is systematically
related to the industry’s degree of price stickiness. Price stickiness is measured via the
industry-level frequency of price adjustment, calculated from PPI microdata. Industries
with a higher frequency of price adjustment (i.e. less sticky prices) experience a smaller
drop in output than industries with a lower frequency frequency of price adjustment (i.e.
more sticky prices) in reaction to the same contractionary monetary policy shock. The
26Table A.3 (alternative ordering) and Table A.4 (alternative shock identification) in the Appendix report
the coefficients on all variables included in the estimation.
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association between an industry’s frequency of price adjustment and the output reaction to
monetary policy shocks is statistically significant and the size of the differential reaction is
economically relevant. A 10% increase in the frequency of price adjustment is associated
with a reduction in the output drop in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock
that is approximately as large as 10% of the drop in total industrial production. This result
is robust to the inclusion of various industry-level control variables, intended to capture
alternative transmission channels of monetary policy.
Qualitatively, the results established in this paper are consistent with predictions of multi-
sector New Keynesian models. Quantitatively, the results provide empirical support for the
New Keynesian view that sticky prices indeed play an important quantitative role in the
transmission of monetary policy to real economic activity. Sticky prices indeed matter for
the monetary transmission mechanism. While the association between an industries degree
of price stickiness and the reaction to monetary policy shocks documented in this Chapter
provides no direct evidence on the degree of aggregate monetary non-neutrality, the results
established in this paper can be used to discipline multi-sector New Keynesian models to
provide new evidence on this classical question.
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Chapter 2
The Geography of Intergenerational
Mobility in Germany
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2.1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility is a key indicator for both fairness and economic efficiency
in a society. When intergenerational mobility is low, a child’s chances of success in life
are largely pre-determined by their parents, which goes against a basic notion of fairness
in most societies. Also, low mobility can lead to misallocation of resources, as talented
children from disadvantaged families are excluded from opportunities that favor those born
in more fortunate circumstances rather than those with the greatest potential. Despite the
overwhelming importance of intergenerational mobility, and recent progress in the empirical
literature, empirical evidence on the extent and drivers of intergenerational mobility is still
rather thin. In this Chapter we contribute to the literature on intergenerational mobility
by providing a comprehensive description of intergenerational mobility in Germany. We
are the first to describe differences in intergenerational mobility in Germany at a detailed
regional level.
The institutional setting in Germany makes it a particularly interesting case to study
intergenerational mobility. Historically, Germany has had smaller levels of income and wage
inequality than the US, the UK, or many southern European countries. While Germany
has seen a notable uptick in inequality in the last 30 years, this increase has been much
less pronounced compared to other countries (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al. (2010)). Moreover,
Germany is often portrayed as a country with particularly inclusive labor market institu-
tions, as indicated by the fact that Germany has Europe’s lowest youth unemployment rate.
These considerations suggest that in Germany inequality is rather low and that equality of
opportunity and intergenerational mobility should be high. But the public perception in
Germany is a different one1. The public debate seems to have converged on the view that
equality of opportunity is ”too low” in Germany, and that the German schooling system
is failing the disadvantaged and is exacerbating differences in family background instead of
”leveling the playing field”2. The practice of tracking students at the relatively early age of
10 or 12 is often cited as a major culprit of this, and many pundits believe that it is a major
impediment to intergenerational mobility in Germany, although academic studies have, so
far, not detected negative causal long-term effects of tracking (Dustmann et al. (2017)).
1See, for example, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article113082544/In-Deutschland-bleibt-
Chancengleichheit-ein-Traum.html.
2See, for example, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/chancenungleichheit-welche-chance-hat-ein-kind-
in-deutschland/9556636.html.
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Is Germany a country of high intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity?
In this Chapter, we present a new set of facts on this question. We present new empirical
evidence on the level and the geography of intergenerational mobility in Germany using
administrative microcensus data from the years 2009 to 2015. This data contains detailed
information on the educational attainment of 268.000 children aged 16 to 22 and their
parents socioeconomic status. In our main approach, we measure intergenerational mobility
by the association between the educational attainment of a child and her parents income.
We focus on the educational attainment of children in our measure of intergenerational
mobility as the particular institutional setting of the German education system makes ed-
ucational attainment in secondary school a strong measure of social status itself and is a
powerful predictor of economic and social outcomes in later life. Furthermore, the education
system is generally seen as one of the most important factors in shaping intergenerational
mobility. Focusing on the educational attainment of children allows us to measure inter-
generational mobility for very recent cohorts (the youngest children in our sample are born
in 1999), providing a very timely measure of intergenerational mobility. Our main child
outcome variable is hence a binary variable, indicating whether a child has obtained an
A-Level degree (”Abitur”) (or is in the process of obtaining this degree) or not.
We focus on income as main parental characteristic to parsimoniously summarize the
economic status and available resources of parents in our main analysis, but consider other
parental characteristics, in particular parental education, in our analysis as well. Following
a series of recent papers (e.g. Chetty et al. (2014) and Acciari et al. (2019)), we rank parents
based on their incomes relative to other parents in our sample and use the percentile rank
of parents in the national income distribution within our sample to measure of parental
income.
We find that the relationship between a child’s probability of obtaining an A-Level degree
and the parents income rank is well described by a linear function at the national level.
This allows us to summarize intergenerational mobility at the national level by the slope
coefficient of a linear regression of the A-Level dummy of children on the parents percentile
rank. We refer to this slope coefficient (multiplied by 100) as parental income gradient.
Based on the linear fit, we find that a 10 percentile point increase in parent income rank is
associated with a 4.8 percentage point increase in the probability of obtaining an A-Level
degree for children.
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To provide a comprehensive description of intergenerational mobility in Germany, we
analyze differences in intergenerational mobility between different groups at the national
level. We find no pronounced differences in the parental income gradient between girls
and boys. We also do not find pronounced differences in parental income gradient between
children with different parental education levels. However, we find pronounced differences
in upward mobility between these groups. We measure upward mobility by the probability
of obtaining an A-Level degree for a child with parents from the bottom quintile of the
national income distribution. We refer to this measure as (absolute) upward mobility, or
Q1 measure. Girls have a nine percentage point higher Q1 measure than boys and children
from households where at least one parent has an A-Level degree have a thirty percentage
point higher Q1 measure compared to children from households where neither parent has an
A-Level degree. When comparing migrants and natives, we find that the parental income
gradient is lower for migrants compared to natives, and that migrants have higher Q1
measure than natives. Lastly, we find that the parental income gradient is higher and
upward mobility is lower in East Germany compared to West Germany.
Next, we characterize variation in intergenerational mobility across local labor markets
(LLM) in Germany. Local labor markets are aggregations of German counties, defined on
the basis of the distribution of local economic activity. We assign children to local labor
markets based on their place of residence at the time they are observed in our sample. We
calculate different measures of absolute and relative intergenerational mobility, intended to
capture different normative concepts, for every local labor market in our sample to compare
mobility across local labor markets. First, we estimate the parental income gradient, defined
as above, separately for every LLM in our sample. This lets us compare (absolute) differences
in the outcomes between children from top versus bottom income families within a LLM
and serves as a first measure of relative intergenerational mobility. Second, we calculate
the relative likelihood of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from families in the
top quintile of the national income distribution and children from families in the bottom
quintile of the national income distribution for every local labor market as an additional
measure of relative mobility. We refer to this measure as Q5/Q1 ratio. The Q5/Q1 ratio lets
us compare relative differences in outcomes between children from rich and poor families,
taking potential differences in the baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree across
local labor markets into account. Furthermore, we calculate the probability of obtaining an
A-Level degree for children with parents from the bottom quintile of the national income
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distribution, the Q1 measure, separately for every LLM. This lets us compare the (absolute)
outcomes of children from poor families across LLMs and serves as a measure of absolute
mobility.
We find substantial variation in our measures of absolute and relative mobility across
LLMs. Relative mobility, summarized by the parental income gradient, is lowest for children
in East Germany, especially in Saxony and Thuringia. The parental income gradient varies
roughly between 0.1 (meaning that a 10 percentile point increase in the parental income rank
is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the probability of obtaining an A-Level
degree) and 0.7 (meaning that a 10 percentile point increase in the parental income rank
is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of obtaining an A-Level
degree) across LLMs in Germany.
We also find pronounced differences in relative mobility as measured by the Q5/Q1
ratio. The Q5/Q1 ratio varies roughly between 2, meaning that in some local labor markets
children from the top quintile of the national income distribution are twice as likely to
obtain an A-Level degree than children from the bottom quintile of the national income
distribution, and 7, meaning that in other local labor markets they are seven times as
likely. The Q5/Q1 ratio is especially high in Bavaria and Thuringia, and low in North
Rhine-Westphalia.
We find substantial variations in absolute mobility as well. The Q1 measure3 varies
between 5% and 40% across LLMs, revealing substantial differences in absolute mobility
across LLMs. Absolute mobility is especially low in Bavaria, and high in North Rhine-
Westphalia.
Absolute and relative mobility are only mildly correlated across LLMs. While on average
LLMs with high absolute mobility (measured by the Q1 measure) are also LLMs of high
relative mobility (measured by the parental income gradient), the correlation between both
measures across local labor markets is rather weak. There exists a substantial number of
LLMs described by low relative mobility (measured by a high parental income gradient), but
high absolute mobility (as measured by the Q1 measure), and vice versa. This highlights
the importance of the normative concept (and hence mobility measure) one uses to compare
mobility across local labor markets.
Our results are robust across different sample specifications, alternative measures of
3Which is the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for children with parents from the bottom
quintile of the national income distribution.
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parental income and alternative measures of intergenerational mobility. We find that our
parental income-based measures of intergenerational mobility generally exhibit a high cor-
relation with measures of intergenerational mobility that are based on parental education
levels.
We document substantial and robust geographical variation in different measures of in-
tergenerational mobility across LLMs in Germany. The next question we address is which
factors drive the observed differences in intergenerational mobility. We investigate to what
extent observed differences in intergenerational mobility measures across LLMs can be ex-
plained by differences in other (non-income) household characteristics across LLMs within
our sample, for example differences in the education level of parents across LLMs. We show
that explicitly controlling for additional household characteristics in the estimation of LLM
specific mobility measures has barely any effect on the order of LLM-specific estimates of
intergenerational mobility we obtain. The correlation between the LLM-specific estimates
of mobility we obtain in our baseline approach and the LLM-specific mobility estimates
we obtain when controlling for additional household characteristics in the calculation of the
mobility measures is substantial. This suggests that differences in intergenerational mobility
across LLMs are not simply driven by differences in household characteristics across LLMs
and that neighborhood effects play a role in shaping intergenerational mobility. Our ap-
proach is complementary to the approach of Chetty and Hendren (2018), who use children
moving across geographical units to identify neighborhood effects.
Lastly, we take a first step at describing which local labor market characteristics correlate
with intergenerational mobility. We do not claim that these correlations should be inter-
preted as a causal relationship, but they can help to guide future research in the search for
causal determinants of intergenerational mobility. We find that intergenerational mobility
differs between urban and rural local labor markets in our sample. Furthermore, our results
suggest that labor market variables (within an LLM) affect intergenerational mobility. The
results also suggest that (broadly defined) social capital and social cohesion might affect
intergenerational mobility.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a detailed
overview over the related literature. Section 2.3 presents an overview over the institutional
background of the German education system. Section 2.4 presents the data used in the
analysis and defines the variables used in the analysis. Section 2.5 presents and discusses
different measures of intergenerational mobility. Section 2.6 presents the results of our
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analysis at the national level. Section 2.7 compares intergenerational mobility between
different groups. Section 2.8 presents the results for regional differences in intergenerational
mobility across local labor markets. Section 2.9 investigates to what extent differences in
household characteristics across LLMs can explain geographical variation in our measures of
intergenerational mobility. Section 2.10 presents local labor market characteristics correlated
with our measures of intergenerational mobility. Section 2.11 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
At the most general level, intergenerational mobility describes to which extent a child’s
social or economic opportunities depend in her parent’s characteristics, like social status, ed-
ucation level or income. As opportunities are hard to measure, empirical studies of intergen-
erational mobility resort to the study of how a child’s outcomes are associated with parental
characteristics (Chetty et al. (2014)). A popular measure of intergenerational mobility is
the degree of intergenerational income mobility, the association between a child’s income
and her parents income. A further widely used measure of intergenerational mobility is
intergenerational educational mobility, the association between the educational attainment
of parents and the educational attainment of their children (Black and Devereux (2011)).
However, the study of intergenerational mobility is not limited to studying the association
between the same outcome for both, parents and children. As described below, there are
also studies investigating e.g. the association between parental income and the educational
attainment of children.
A comparatively rich literature exists on the measurement of intergenerational mobility
in the United States. Much of this literature is interested in measuring the degree of inter-
generational income mobility, but other measures of intergenerational mobility are studied
as well.
Two early seminal paper in this literature are Zimmerman (1992) and Solon (1992).
Both papers present estimates of the degree of intergenerational income mobility in the
United States. In both papers, intergenerational income mobility is measured via the inter-
generational elasticity of earnings (hereafter IGE). Both papers find estimates of the IGE
coefficient of around 0.4, meaning a one percent increase in parental income is associated
with a 0.4 percent increase in the income of the child.
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Mazumder (2005) suggests that previous estimates of the IGE in the United States have
been biased downwards due to various measurement issues. Correcting for these measure-
ment issues Mazumder (2005) estimates the IGE in the United States to be around 0.6,
substantially higher than previous estimates suggested.
Dahl and DeLeire (2008) estimate measures of intergenerational mobility using adminis-
trative earnings data from the US Social Security administration records. They show that
estimates of the IGE are quite sensitive to the exact specification and sample used and can
range from 0.26 to 0.63 using US data. They propose a new measure of intergenerational
income mobility, the association between fathers’ and children’s relative positions (ranks) in
their respective earnings distributions. This measure is summarized by the regression of the
(relative) rank of the child on the (relative) rank of the parents in their respective income
distributions. This rank-rank slope is much more robust to specification and sample choices
than the IGE. Dahl and DeLeire (2008) estimate a rank-rank slope of roughly 0.3 for males,
meaning that a 10 percentile point increase in a father’s relative position is associated with
roughly a 3 percentile point increase in his son’s relative earnings position.
Using administrative tax return data, Chetty et al. (2014) confirm the findings of Dahl
and DeLeire (2008). The reported estimates of the IGE obtained from tax return data in
Chetty et al. (2014) range from 0.26 to 0.7, covering the whole range of estimates reported in
the previous literature. The rank-rank slope is much more robust to the exact specification
and is estimated to be 0.34, rather similar to Dahl and DeLeire (2008). Chetty et al.
(2014) are the first to document substantial geographical variation in the rank-rank slope
across regions in the US. Different regions in the US are described by different degrees of
intergenerational mobility, with the rank-rank slope ranging from 0.07 to 0.5 across regions.
Similar geographical variation is found in a measure of absolute mobility, the expect income
rank of a child from the 25 percentile of the parental income distribution.
Furthermore, Chetty et al. (2014) find a strong association between educational outcomes
of children (measured e.g. by the probability to attend college at the age of 19) and the
parental income rank. They refer to the slope coefficient on the parental income rank in a
regression of a dummy variable indicating whether a child attends college at the age of 19 on
the parental income rank as college attendance gradient. At the national level, this college
attendance gradient is estimated to be 0.675, meaning that a 10 percentile point increase
in the parental income position is associated with an increase in the probability of college
attendance of 6.75 percentage points. This college attendance gradient exhibits substantial
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geographical variation as well, varying between 0.3 and 0.9 across US commuting zones. The
correlation between the college attendance gradient and the rank-rank slope for income is
0.68 (0.72 population weighted) between commuting zones, indicating a tight link between
income mobility of children and their educational outcomes.
Chetty and Hendren (2018) study the causal effect of the place of residence (which they
refer to as neighborhoods) on the intergenerational mobility of children by comparing the
later life outcomes of children moving to different neighborhoods at different ages. They find
that the regional variation in intergenerational mobility documented in Chetty et al. (2014)
is largely due to the causal effect of places rather than differences in the characteristics of
residents across regions. Furthermore, they find that places matter for intergenerational
mobility largely due to differences in childhood environment, rather than the differences in
labor market conditions in later life. Lastly, they find that every year spent in a place as a
child matters roughly equally.
Chetty et al. (2017) study the role of colleges for intergenerational mobility in greater
detail. Access to college is highly associated with parental income. However, children from
low- and high-income families have similar earnings outcomes conditional on the quality
of the college they attend, indicating the importance of educational attainment in shaping
intergenerational mobility.
Compared to the US, research on the degree of intergenerational mobility in Germany is
more scarce. Schnitzlein (2016) compares intergenerational income mobility between Ger-
many and the US, based on comparable survey data sets from both countries. He estimates
intergenerational income mobility via the IGE as described above. The IGE coefficient is
estimated to be lower in Germany compared to the US (meaning that intergenerational
income mobility is higher in Germany). However, Schnitzlein (2016) notes that even a rea-
sonable degree of variation in sampling rules leads to similar estimates in both countries,
preventing a clear conclusion which country exhibits a higher degree of intergenerational
mobility.
Bratberg et al. (2017) compare intergenerational income mobility between Germany, Nor-
way, Sweden and the US. Bratberg et al. (2017) measure intergenerational income mobility
using rank-rank slopes. The rank-rank slope for Germany is estimated at 0.245, comparable
to rank-rank slopes in Norway and Sweden and lower than in the US. However, results for
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Germany are based on only around 1000 children born between 1957 and 1976. No difference
in rank-rank slopes is found between North- and South Germany.
More evidence exists on the degree of intergenerational educational mobility in Germany.
Riphahn and Heineck (2009) investigate intergenerational educational mobility in Ger-
many over 50 years, for the birth cohorts from 1929 to 1978. Intergenerational educational
mobility is measured via the extent to which children’s secondary school attainment de-
pends on parental characteristics, in particular parental education. The authors find no
evidence of a significant change in the role of the parental educational attainment for child
educational outcomes over the last decades.
Riphahn and Tru¨bswetter (2013) extent the study of Riphahn and Heineck (2009) to more
recent cohorts (with the youngest cohort being born in 1987) and compare intergenerational
educational mobility between East and West Germany. They find that intergenerational
educational mobility is lower in East Germany than it is in West Germany.
Klein et al. (2019) compare educational mobility between East- and West Germany for
birth cohorts between 1929 to 1992. They measure educational mobility as the probability
of a child of obtaining an A-Level degree (Abitur) conditional of parental education level.
They find no pronounced differences in educational persistence between East- and West
Germany for Birth cohorts since 1987. For cohorts born since 1987, they find that the
probability to obtain an A-Level degree is approximately 40% higher if at least one parent
has an A-Level degree herself (compared to children where neither parent has an A-Level
degree) in both East- and West Germany.
2.3 Institutional Background
We focus on the educational attainment of children conditional on parental characteristics
(in particular parental income) as our measure of intergenerational mobility. The particular
institutional setting of the German education system makes educational attainment in sec-
ondary education a well-suited measure to study intergenerational mobility. This allows us
to measure intergenerational mobility for very recent cohorts (the youngest children in our
sample are born in 1999), providing a (comparatively) timely measure of intergenerational
mobility. Furthermore, children typically still live at home while completing secondary ed-
ucation, which allows us to use (micro)census data to measure intergenerational mobility,
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where we can link children and parents living in the same household. This section explains
the institutional setting of the German education system and provides evidence on the
relevance of our measure.
2.3.1 The German Education System
This section provides an overview over the secondary schooling system in Germany. The
overview presented here follows Dustmann et al. (2017) and describes the general structure
of the secondary schooling system in Germany.
Before describing the general structure, it should be noted that the responsibility for the
education system falls under the jurisdiction of the German states, not under the Federal
Governments jurisdiction. The general structure of the education system is the same in all
German states, but there are differences in the exact institutional details between German
states.
For the first 4 years of school (age 6 to 10)4 all children attend primary school. After
primary school, students are allocated to one of three different tracks, namely Hauptschule,
Realschule and Gymnasium. The three tracks lead to different degrees, described below.
Following Dustmann et al. (2017), we refer to these tracks as ”low”, ”medium” and ”high”
track.
There is no strict rule to determine which track children can attend after elementary
school, but elementary school teachers do make recommendations. In most states parents
have the final decision which track their child should attend following primary school. In
a few states, track choice is limited by the marks of the child in the final year of primary
school.
Education in the low and medium track lasts five, respectively six years (until year 9/10),
whereas the high track lasts eight or nine years (until year 12/13, dependent on the birth
cohort and the federal state5). The low and medium track prepare students for vocational
training in blue-collar (e.g. crafts) and white-collar (e.g. medical assistant or office clerk)
occupations. The high track is comparatively more academically oriented and prepares
4In the states of Berlin and Brandenburg primary school includes the first 6 years of school (age 6 to 12).
5An overview over the different regulation within different German states can be found on the
website of the Standing Conference of State Education secretaries (Kultusministerkonferenz) available
at https://www.kmk.org/themen/allgemeinbildende-schulen/bildungswege-und-abschluesse/sekundarstufe-
ii-gymnasiale-oberstufe-und-abitur.html
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students for tertiary education at academic institutions. Successful completion of the high
track results in the award of an A-Level degree (Abitur).
Furthermore, there exists a type of school that does not follow the tracking system
(”integrierte Gesamtschule”). At this type of school, all students attend the same classes
together until year 10, but the level of classes is possibly differentiated on a subject-by-
subject basis.6 Important for our analysis, this type of school is only non-tracking until
grade 10. At these schools, if students stay in school after year 10, they can only attend
classes at the level of the high track (”Gymnasiale Oberstufe”). Students attending such
a school after year 10 do so with the goal of graduating with an A-Level degree, same as
students at a regular high track school.
The German schooling system allows students to switch tracks. After completing the low
or medium track, students have the possibility to upgrade their degree and attend the next
higher track. A student graduating from the low track can stay in school one more year and
complete the medium track. Similarly, a student completing the medium track can switch
to a regular high track school and obtain an A-Level degree. Furthermore, after year 10,
students have the possibility to switch to a specialized high track. This specialized high track
leads to an A-Level degree as well, but possibly limits the field of study (”Fachgebundene
Hochschulreife”). A comprehensive analysis of track switching in the German schooling
system can be found in Biewen and Tapalaga (2017).
For the purpose of our analysis, it is important that a student who is enrolled in a regular
school7 after year 10 (enrolled in school years 11 to 13) is studying with the goal of obtaining
an A-Level degree.
Due to the fact that educational policy in Germany falls in the jurisdiction of the German
states, there are state-level differences in the education system. At the stage of years 11 to
13 in the high track, the state-level regulations differ e.g. in the type of classes students
need to attend (e.g. some states require students to take 4 weekly hours of math, whereas
students can choose between 3 or 5 hours weekly hours of math in other states). However,
the Standing Conference of State Education secretaries (”Kultusministerkonferenz”) has
the stated goal to ensure a high degree of comparability of educational qualifications across
German States. There are no legal differences between the A-Level degrees issued from dif-
6So a child can e.g. attend English classes at the level of the low track and at the same time math classes
at the level of the high track.
7Here meaning not enrolled in a special education school, ”Fo¨rderschule”, or enrolled in a vocational
school
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ferent German States, all states legally recognize A-Level degrees awarded by other German
states. Furthermore, differences between different school tracks are more pronounced than
differences between the same track across different states. Dustmann et al. (2017) report
that 80% of the variation in school-level mean test scores in ninth grade can be explained by
track choice alone, suggesting that schools of the same track are fairly homogeneous, even
across states.
However, there exist state-level differences in the institutional setting. To our knowledge,
there exists no comprehensive academic study investigating whether the return to an A-Level
degree depends on the state where the degree was obtained. Furthermore, we are also not
aware of any study comparing standardized test scores of children enrolled in grades 11 to
13 across German states (comparable studies are limited to earlier grades, e.g. grade 9, as
noted above). We present a first step to compare A-Level degrees across states in Section
B.1 in the Appendix. In Section B.1 in the Appendix, we calculate state-specific A-Level
wage premia for full-time workers based on the current place of residence of the worker. We
find that there is a substantial A-Level wage premium in every state, and that differences in
the A-Level wage premium across states are rather small, compared to the size of A-Level
wage premium.
2.3.2 Benefits of an A-Level degree
The particular institutional setting in the German education system described above
makes the graduation from the high-level track a meaningful outcome to measure intergen-
erational mobility of children. First, graduation from the high track grants access to the
(free) national university system in Germany, offering students who graduate from this track
more educational and occupational choices than students graduating from the other tracks.
Also, individuals with an A-Level degree have substantially better economic outcomes
than persons without an A-Level degree on average. There is a substantial wage premium
associated with an A-Level degree. Using data on full-time workers aged 30 to 45 in the
waves 2009 to 2014 in the German Mikrozensus (described below), we find an A-Level wage
premium of around 44% for monthly net income. Details on the calculation can be found
in the Appendix in Section B.1. In Section B.1, we also present evidence that state-level
differences in the A-Level wage premium are rather small, especially compared to the size of
the A-Level wage premium. Furthermore, Schmillen and Stu¨ber (2014) report a substantial
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A-Level premium for total (gross) lifetime earnings. The total lifetime earnings of individuals
with an A-Level degree (but no university degree) are estimated to be 44% higher than the
total (gross) lifetime earnings of individuals without an A-Level degree (and no vocational
training). This figure becomes even higher if individuals additionally have obtained a college
degree8, which usually requires an A-Level degree first.9
An A-Level degree is not only associated with higher income levels, but also with a lower
risk of being unemployed. In the year 2013, the unemployment rate of persons with an
A-Level degree was about only half as high as the unemployment rate of persons with a
medium track degree (5.6% vs 10%), and much lower than the unemployment rate of people
with a low track degree (17.6%), see Hausner et al. (2015).
An A-Level degree is also a beneficial factor for obtaining vocational training in certain
(white-collar) occupations, like bank clerk (Klein et al. (2019)). Furthermore, an A-Level
degree associated with a higher life expectancy (Ga¨rtner (2002)). As a side note, we also
note that anecdotal evidence suggests that an A-Level degree is still highly regarded within
the German public. The fact that the German politician Martin Schulz, former front-
runner of the German Social Democratic Party, never obtained an A-Level degree sparked a
substantial debate in the German media10, indicating that among certain groups in Germany,
an A-Level degree is viewed as an important mark of distinction.
All of this indicates that an A-Level degree is indeed a meaningful measure of economic
success. Finally, one should not forget that many people hold the firm belief that education
has substantial worth in itself, regardless of the economic benefits associated with education.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Mikrozensus
The primary dataset used in our analysis is the German microcensus (Mikrozensus, here-
after MZ), an annual representative survey of the German population, administered by the
statistical office of Germany (Destatis). The survey is comparable to, but more detailed
8University of ”Fachhochschulabschluss”
9Schmillen and Stu¨ber (2014) further report that total (gross) lifetime earnings of individuals with an A-
Level degree (but no university degree) are estimated to be 17.8% higher than lifetime earnings of individuals
with vocational training, but no A-Level degree. Lifetime Earnings of University graduates are estimated
to be 75% higher than lifetime earnings of individuals with vocational training, but no A-Level degree.
10see e.g. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/martin-schulz-debatte-um-abitur-ungehoerig-
kommentar-a-1124658.html
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than, the American Community Survey. The MZ is the largest survey program of official
statistics in Germany. In West Germany the first MZ was administered in 1957, in East
Germany in 1991. Results of the MZ are widely used in official statistics in Germany and
in various EU-wide surveys. In our analysis, we pool the waves 2009 to 2015 of the MZ.
Every year approximately 1% of the population living in Germany is randomly selected
to participate in the survey. In recent years, around 800,000 individuals participate in the
survey every year. The sampling units are residential properties in Germany, rather than
individuals. Sampling is based on the registry of all addresses in Germany. The sampling
scheme is designed to ensure that the sample is representative of the German population.
If a dwelling is selected to be included in the survey, all persons living in this particular
location are legally required to participate in the survey. Once selected, participation is
mandatory and refusal to participate can result in fines or even incarceration. An overview
over the MZ can be found on the website of the German federal statistical office11.
The questions in the MZ cover a wide range of topics, including family status, citizenship,
living conditions, labor market status, income and educational attainment.
Once a dwelling is selected to be included in the MZ, it will remain in the survey for 4
subsequent years, before it is rotated out. Hence the MZ is a revolving panel, with roughly
one quarter of respondents changing from year to year. However, the MZ does not contain
pre-defined panel identifiers, preventing us from tracking the same individuals over time.
2.4.2 Linking Children and Parents
If an address is selected to be included in the MZ, information on all household members,
including underage children, must be provided. A set of questions in the survey is designed
to describe the (family) relationship between all household members. These questions allow
us to link parents and children as long as they are living in the same household.
Specifically, the MZ asks whether the father or the mother of the respondent is living in
the same household. We identify children living with their parents as individuals who state
that they live in the same household as at least one of their parents.12 Furthermore, the
data also allows to link the responses of children to the responses provided by their parents.
11Under this link:https://www.destatis.de/DE/Methoden/Qualitaet/Qualitaetsberichte/Bevoelkerung/mikrozensus-
2017.html.
12Parents in the sense of the MZ are not only biological parents, but also step-, adoptive and foster
parents.
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The format of the data imposes two constraints on our analysis. First, we are able to
match parents and children as long as they live in the same household. However, we are not
able to link children who moved out of their parental household to their parents. Second,
we observe parents and children at the same point in time. Hence we are not able to use
lagged parent or household characteristics as explanatory variables in our analysis.
Table 2.1 denotes the share of children living with their parents by age of the child,
calculated from our data. Practically all children younger than 15 still live with their
parents and are not reported in the Table. We can clearly see that the share of children
living with their parents (i.e. children we can link to their parents) is decreasing with child
age. While 83% of 19 year olds are living with their parents, only 36% of 24 year olds are
living with their parents.
Table 2.1: Share of Children Living With Their Parents by Child Age
Child Age Share living with parents
15 0.987
16 0.978
17 0.962
18 0.921
19 0.831
20 0.720
21 0.615
22 0.525
23 0.439
24 0.363
This Table reports the fraction of children living with their parents among all children in the waves
2009 to 2015 of the German microcensus by age of the children.
2.4.3 Educational Attainment of Children
The primary measure for educational attainment of children in our analysis is a binary
variable that is equal to one if a child has already obtained an A-Level degree or if a child
is on track to obtain an A-Level degree, and zero otherwise. Specifically, our child outcome
variable is equal to one under two conditions. Our outcome variable is equal to one either if
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(i) the child has obtained anA-Level degree13 or (ii) if the child is currently enrolled in the
so-called ”Gymnasiale Oberstufe” (school years 11 to 13), which leads to an A-Level degree
at the successful completion of school. If not stated otherwise, we refer to this outcome
variable as A-Level degree.
We choose this definition for several reasons. First of all, defining our child outcome
variable like this allows us to include younger children in our sample. This reduces concerns
of bias induced by children moving out of their parents household, which is more severe
for older children (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, using this broader definition reduces mea-
surement error in our outcome measure for older children (aged around 18 to 19). A-Level
degrees are usually awarded towards the end of the school year (roughly in the second quar-
ter of the calendar year). Answers to the MZ are collected throughout the whole calendar
year. Hence we have a non-negligible amount of children in our sample that are surveyed
before their graduation, but eventually graduate with an A-Level degree in the same year.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that, if we only count children who have already
obtained an A-Level degree, we would miss-measure our outcome variable for around 40% of
the graduating cohort in the survey year.14 On the other hand the share of children failing
the final examination in a given year is very low (around 3 percent on average Germany-wide
in 2014)15. The way our outcome variable is defined hence helps us to reduce measurement
issues associated with the nature of our data. We further discuss this point when discussing
our primary sample definition in the following paragraph.
2.4.4 Sample Definition and Summary Statistics
In our primary sample, we restrict our analysis to children aged (including) 16 to 22,
living in the same household as at least one parent.16
13Defined here as Abitur and Fachhochschulreife.
14Consider the following example. A child is currently enrolled in the last year of school of the high
track. The child graduates from the high track in July, obtaining an A-Level degree. The household of
the child is surveyed in the MZ in February, when the child has not graduated yet. Hence, if we only take
into account completed A-Level degrees, we would miss-measure the A-Level degree for around 40% of the
children graduating from the high track in a given year. This calculation is based on the fact that data
collection for the MZ is distributed evenly over the year.
15An overview over the share of children failing the final examination can be
found on the website of the KMK under this link:https://www.kmk.org/dokumentation-
statistik/statistik/schulstatistik/abiturnoten.html
16We exclude children living in shared accommodation facilities (”Gemeinschaftsunterku¨nfte”) and chil-
dren living in households in which at least one household members primary occupation is self-employed
farmer. For both types of households, it is not possible to measure household income (for these households,
household income is always recorded as zero). For this reason, we exclude households with a reported total
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The age cut-offs of 16 and 22 are chosen to balance the following trade-off. For older
children, our child outcome variable is measured more precisely, i.e. we don’t need to rely on
enrollment in the high track, but are more likely to observe the completed degree. However,
the share of children living with their parents is decreasing in the age of the child, see
Table 2.1, and moving out of the parental household is not random. For younger children,
moving out of the parental household is a less severe concern, as a larger share of children is
still living with their parents. On the other hand, educational outcomes are measured less
precisely for younger children.
To balance this trade-off, we focus on children aged 16 to 22 in our primary sample. The
lower cut-off of 16 is chosen as children in school year 11 (the first year of ”Gymnasiale
Oberstufe”) are typically between 16 and 17 years old. The upper cut-off of 22 is chosen as,
at this age, still more than 50% of children live in their parental household. Furthermore,
the choice of the cut-offs ensures that we observe a sufficient amount of children in every
local labor market in our regional analysis (described in Section 2.8).
To alleviate concerns related to the sample composition, for our main results we report
robustness checks where we only use children aged 16 to 19, 17 to 20 and 20 to 22. It
should be noted that, for the purpose of regional comparisons, the possible bias induced
through the sample composition is only a concern if this bias differs across geographical
units. The regional variation we find is very similar across samples, indicating that possible
bias induced through sample composition is not a severe concern for our results.
We present summary statistics for the children in our main sample in Table 2.2.
net household income of zero. These recorded zeros do not indicate an actual income of zero, but rather
that no income measurement is available in our data.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics - Children 16-22
Children 16-22
N = 268523 Mean SD
Household Size 3.84 1.16
Share of Children with A-Level 0.403 .49
No. of Children in Household 2.01 0,98
Share of Single Parent Households 0.26 0,44
Total Household Income 3210.68 2343.08
Child Age 18.70 1.94
Share of Females 0.46 0.49
Share Parent A-Level 0.33 0.47
Share Parent College Degree 0.21 0,37
Migrantional Background 0.25 0.43
Fathers Age 50.02 6.03
Mothers Age 47.07 5.26
This Table reports the summary statistics for our main sample, children aged 16 to 22 living with
their parents in the waves 2009 to 2015 of the German MZ. The share of children with A-Level is
calculated according to the definition described in Section 2.4.3.
Here, we elaborate on the summary statistics presented in Table 2.2. The share of children
with an A-Level degree is the fraction of children in our sample who have an A-Level degree
according to the definition of A-Level degree described in Section 2.4.3. Slightly more than
40% of children in our primary sample have an A-Level degree (or attend the last 2/3 years
of school leading to an A-Level degree). As a plausibility check, we compare this number to
a comparable statistic calculated using publicly available data from the German Statistical
Office. The A-Level share in our sample is slightly lower than the share of persons aged
20 to 24 with a (completed) A-Level degree17 in the years 2009 to 2015 calculated using
publicly available data. The share of persons aged 20 to 24 with completed A-Level degree is
44.85%18 when pooling the years 2009 to 2015, slightly higher than the share of children with
an A-Level degree in our sample. This difference suggests that we (slightly) underestimate
the share of children with an A-Level degree. This is due to several reasons. First, not every
17completed ”Abitur” or ”Fachhochschulreife”
18This number is calculated using data from DESTATIS, using Table 12211-0040 (”Bevo¨lkerung (ab 15
Jahren): Deutschland, Jahre, Geschlecht, Altersgruppen, Allgemeine Schulausbildung”)in Genesis Online.
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16 year old child is already enrolled in school year 11, but might be enrolled in school year
10, even if she attends the high level school track19. Including 16 year olds in the calculation
of the A-Level share hence leads to an underestimation of the share, even when using our
(broader) definition of A-Level. Second, while children might still obtain an A-Level degree
later in life, it would be very uncommon for someone to lose an already obtained A-Level
degree, so for a given cohort the share of persons with an A-Level degree should increase
in the age of the cohort (at least in the age range we consider, where differential mortality
should not be a significant issue). Lastly, for older children (from 20 onwards), the A-Level
share is slightly higher for children that already moved out of the parental household in our
sample. These reasons explain why the A-Level share in our sample is slightly lower than
comparable numbers calculated using older children from publicly available data.
After having explained our measure of educational attainment of children in detail, we
now turn to other household characteristics of our sample. Around 26% of children live in
single-parent households. Around 82% of children living in single parent households live
with their mother.
Total household income reported in Table 2.2 is monthly total net household income,
excluding the income of all children present in the household. Income here is expressed in
2015 Euro (i.e. adjusted for inflation). Median household income is 2795.93 (not reported
in Table 2.2). We describe the measurement of income in the MZ in detail in Section 2.4.5.
Around 33% of children live in a household where at least one parent has obtained an A-
Level degree and 21% of children live in a household where at least one parent has obtained a
University degree (”Universita¨t” or ”Fachhochschulreife”). If not stated explicitly otherwise,
we always measure parental education as the highest degree obtained by either parent20.
Around 25% of children in our sample have migrational background (”Migrationshinter-
grund”). We define migrational background using the same definition as German official
statistics. A person is defined to have migrational background if this person was (i) either
born without German citizenship herself or (ii) has at least one parent born without German
citizenship. We use this definition to define migrational background as it is commonly used
in official German statistics.
19The share of 16 year olds with an A-Level according to our definition is 20%.
20If, for example, the Mother of a child has a University degree and the Father has completed vocational
training, we measure parental education at the child level as a University degree.
66
2.4.5 Measurement of Parental Income
This Section explains the measurement of parental income in detail. Our primary measure
of parental income is the monthly total net household income, excluding the monthly total
net income of all dependent children in the household. We refer to this variable as parental
income. We focus on parental income as our main characteristic of parents as it allows us
to parsimoniously summarize the economic status and available resources of parents. This
income measure includes all sources of income, including e.g. labor income, firm profits
and social security transfers received. Income in the MZ is always reported in terms of net
income, rather than gross income. This means that income is reported net of tax payments
and social security contributions (like unemployment insurance or health insurance premia
paid by the individual). From here on, income always refers to the monthly total net
income (of the household or an individual), if not stated explicitly otherwise. We exclude
the income of dependent children from our household income measure in order to focus on
parental resources. Income reported in the MZ is always the income in the month preceding
the survey, but includes all regular annual payments21.
Our data contains a continuous measure of household income, which we use as our main
income measure. This income measure is not asked directly in the survey, but imputed by
the Statistical Office. Imputation is based on the reported personal income of all household
members. The imputation procedure is described in Section B.2 in the Appendix.
We are aware that the imputation of income leads to measurement error in our income
variable. However, this measurement error should be independent of the educational out-
comes of children, and independent of the geographical location of the household. Hence,
while the imputation leads to imprecision in our estimates, it should not induce a bias.
We use parental income as baseline income measure in our analysis. The results of
our regional analysis are robust to using total household income instead of total parental
income22. Total household income and total parental income exhibit a very high correlation
(ρ = 0.91), as most children living with their parents have zero or relatively little income.
Adjusting for Household Size: Households do not only differ in terms of income, but also
in terms of household size. We consider three different approaches to adjust for differences in
21For example, if respondents receive a 13th monthly salary, or a regular annual bonus, 112 of the amount
of this payment should be added to the reported monthly income measure.
22The difference between the two measures is that total household income also includes the income of all
children present in the household. When using total household income as income measure, instead of total
parental income, we find lower parental income gradients at the national level, as expected.
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household size. First, we do not adjust for differences in household size and measure income
as parental income not adjusted for household size. This approach has been pursued by
e.g. Chetty et al. (2014) and Hilger (2015). We then consider two approaches to adjust for
differences in household composition. The first approach is to divide parental income by the
number of household members n and hence measure parental income per capita. We refer
to this income measure as income per household member. Lastly, we follow the literature
on equivalence scales (e.g. Pollak and Wales (1979)) and use parental income divided by
the square root of the number of household members
√
n as third income measure. We refer
to this income measure as equivalence scale income.
The first approach tends to measure how educational attainment of children is associ-
ated with the economic status of the parents, whereas the second and third that approach
rather tends to measure how educational attainment of children is associated with available
economic resources. Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows the average household size in each
percentile of the income distribution (not adjusted for household size) in our primary sam-
ple. Figure B.1 shows that when we do not adjust income for household size, households in
the bottom half of the income distribution are on average smaller than households in upper
half of the national income distribution.
Household Income Percentiles: Finally, following Chetty et al. (2014) and Dahl and
DeLeire (2008), we assign every household its percentile rank in the income distribution
relative to all other households within our sample, separately for every year. Household
percentile rank is hence based on the rank of the household relative to all other households
within our sample within the same year. By assigning the percentile ranks within the
same year (and doing this separately for every year), we avoid adjusting reported income
for inflation23. We calculate percentile ranks separately for all three incomes measures
discussed above.
Figures B.2, B.3 and B.4 in the Appendix show the empirical cumulative distribution
function of the three income measures based on wave 2014 of the MZ to illustrate our
approach.
23When we first adjust incomes for realized inflation and then calculate percentile ranks using the whole
sample, the results we obtain are basically identical to our baseline approach.
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2.5 Measuring Intergenerational Mobility: Absolute
vs Relative Mobility
Before presenting the results of our analysis, we here present how we measure inter-
generational mobility. At the most general level, intergenerational mobility is described
by the joint distribution of parent and child characteristics. However, the measurement of
intergenerational mobility requires to summarize this joint distribution by a parsimonious
set of statistics (Chetty et al. (2014)). Following Chetty et al. (2014), we report different
measures of intergenerational mobility. The different measures we report aim at capturing
two different normative concepts: relative and absolute mobility.
Relative Mobility : As the name suggests, relative mobility is concerned with the difference
in outcomes between children from low-income families compared to children from high-
income families. In the context of our analysis, relative mobility can be summarized by the
question:
”How does the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree differ between children from
low-income households and children from high-income households?”.
We focus on two measures of relative mobility to answer this question. Our first measure
of relative mobility is aimed at measuring the (absolute) difference in the probability of
obtaining an A-Level degree between children from rich and poor parents24. The second
measure we report is aimed at measuring the relative likelihood of obtaining an A-Level
degree between children from rich and poor parents25.
To calculate the first measure of relative mobility, we estimate the slope coefficient β of
a regression of our binary outcome variable Yi on the parental income rank Ri:
Yi = α + βRi + i (2.1)
If the relationship between parental income rank and the probability of obtaining an A-
Level degree is well described by a linear function (we provide evidence that this is indeed
the case later on), the slope coefficient of this regression provides a parsimonious measure
24Hence a possible answer to the question asked before could e.g. be: the probability to obtain an A-
Level degree is 30 percentage points higher for children from rich families, compared to children from poor
families.
25hence a possible answer to the question asked before could e.g. be: children from rich families are twice
as likely to obtain an A-Level degree, compared to children form poor families.
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of relative mobility. Then, the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree of a child from a
given income percentile r is given by:
E(Yi = 1|Ri = r) = α + βr (2.2)
and the difference in probabilities between two income percentiles r and q, r > q, is given
by:
E(Yi = 1|Ri = r)− E(Yi = 1|Ri = q) = β(r − q) (2.3)
Hence the slope coefficient summarizes the difference in the probability of obtaining an
A-Level degree between households from different income percentiles well. We use estimates
of this slope coefficient β as our first measure of relative mobility. In what follows, we refer
to β × 100 as (parental) income gradient. For better readability, we always multiply β by
100, i.e. we consistently report β×100. β×100 is the difference in the probability to obtain
an A-Level degree between children from the very top of the income distribution and the
very bottom of the income distribution, based on the linear fit described in Equation 2.1.
Hence our first measure of intergenerational mobility, the parental income gradient is given
by:
Parental Income Gradient = β × 100 (2.4)
We also report a second measure of relative mobility. One might also be interested in
the relative likelihood of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from rich and poor
families26.
We measure the relative likelihood of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from
rich and poor families as the ratio of the share of children who obtain an A-Level degree
from the top quintile of the income distribution and the share of children who obtain an
A-Level degree from the bottom quintile of the income distribution:
Q5/Q1 =
E(Yi = 1|Ri ≥ 80)
E(Yi = 1|Ri < 20) (2.5)
We refer to this measure as Q5/Q1 ratio. This measure can be interpreted as the relative
likelihood of obtaining an A-Level degree between both groups, e.g. Q5/Q1 = 2 would mean
26i.e. how many times more likely are children from rich families to obtain an A-Level degree than children
from poor families.
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that children from the top quintile of the income distribution are twice as likely to obtain
an A-Level degree than children from the bottom quintile of the income distribution.
In the calculation of the Q5/Q1 ratio, we do not rely on the linear fit as described in
Equation 2.1, but calculate the probability to obtain an A-Level degree non-parametrically
for each quintile of the income distribution. We have also calculated the Q5/Q1 ratio based
on the linear fit described by Equation 2.1 and obtain very similar results.
For both measures of relative mobility, the parental income gradient and the Q5/Q1
ratio, a higher value implies lower relative mobility. It should also be noted that, while
both measures are measures of relative mobility, they aim at capturing different normative
concepts. Hence when comparing mobility measures across regions, it might well be the
case that a region is described by a (comparatively) low parental income gradient, but at
the same time by a high Q5/Q1 ratio27.
Absolute Mobility :
A different question with regards to intergenerational mobility in the context of our
analysis is the following:
”What is the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for a child from a given (poor)
household income level?”.
The normative implication of this question is obviously different from the one before. The
question posed here is concerned with the absolute outcomes of (disadvantaged) children,
regardless of the outcomes of children from more advantaged households.
Following Chetty et al. (2014), we present two measure aimed at answering this question.
The first one is the expected probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for a child from
the very bottom of the parental income distribution implied by the regression in Equation
2.1, i.e. the constant estimated from this regression. We refer to the constant as baseline
probability:
Baseline Probability = E(Yi = 1|Ri = 0) = α (2.6)
The second measure of absolute mobility we report is the probability of obtaining an
27This could be the case if the baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree, described under
Absolute Mobility, is low in this region as well.
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A-Level degree of a child from the bottom quintile of the national income distribution:
Q1 = E(Yi = 1|Ri < 20) (2.7)
We refer to this measure as Q1 measure. We always calculate the Q1 measure non-
parametrically as the share of children obtaining an A-Level degree in the bottom quintile
of the income distribution. If the relationship between the probability of obtaining an A-
Level degree and parental income rank is (close to) linear across the whole income (rank)
distribution (we present evidence that this is the case later on), both measures will lead
to very similar results. We present both measures to ensure the robustness of the results
we obtain. For both measures, the baseline probability and the Q1 measure, a high value
implies high absolute mobility.
We present different measures of both, relative and absolute mobility, as both sets of
measures provide useful information to answer the question which regions are described by
a high degree of intergenerational mobility. The answer to the question which region exhibit
high intergenerational mobility might depend, after all, on the exact question asked.
2.6 National Results
2.6.1 Comparing Different Measures of Household Income
In this Section, we describe the association between parental income rank and the child’s
probability of obtaining an A-Level degree at the national level. We present the results at
the national level for the different income measures discussed in Section 2.4.5.
Figure 2.1 shows how the share of children with an A-Level degree varies with the position
in the parental income distribution. The income measure used in Figure 2.1 is parental
income (not adjusted for household size). The linear fit (black line) slightly overestimates
the A-Level share between (roughly) the 30th and 80th percentile, and underestimates it
in the tails of the income distribution. The linear fit based on this income measure has
a constant (baseline probability) of α = .169 and a slope coefficient of β = .0045, i.e. a
parental income gradient of β × 100 = 0.45. The slope of the linear fit implies that a
10 percentage point increase in parental income rank is associated with an increase in the
probability of obtaining an A-Level by 4.5 percentage points.
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Figure 2.1: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: No Adjustment for Household Size
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents the national parental income distribution when parental income is not adjusted
for household size (x-axis). The Figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-22 currently
enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all
children in this bin vs. the parent rank for each bin. The Figure is based on N = 268523 children
living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income rank in
the underlying micro-data (black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0045 and a constant of 0.169.
In Figure 2.2, we measure income as parental income divided by the number of household
members (i.e. parental income per capita). Interestingly, this results in a relationship that
is better approximated by a linear relationship, compared to the case with no adjustment
for household size. The linear fit based on this income measure has a constant (baseline
probability) of α = .166 and a slope coefficient of β = .0048, i.e. a parental income gradient
of β × 100 = 0.48. When using this income measure, a 10 percentage point increase in
the parental income rank is associated with an increase in the probability of obtaining an
A-Level degree of the child of 4.8 percentage points.
Figure B.5 in the Appendix presents the results at the national level when we divide
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Figure 2.2: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Income per Household Member
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis). The
Figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile point bins (so that there are 100
bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-22 currently enrolled in the last two/three years
of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all children in this bin vs. the parent
rank for each bin. The Figure is based on N = 268523 children living with their parents. The OLS
regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income rank in the underlying micro-data (black
line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0048 and a constant of 0.166.
parental income by the square root of the number of household members (equivalence scale
income). This results in a relationship between parental income rank and the share of
children obtaining an A-Level degree that is more linear than the one presented in Figure
2.1, but less linear than the relationship displayed in Figure 2.2. The linear fit based on this
income measure has a constant (baseline probability) of α = .159 and a slope coefficient of
β = .0048, i.e. a parental income gradient of β × 100 = 0.48.
The results presented in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and B.5 show that that linear fit based on the
three different income measures results in very similar estimates for the baseline probability
(the constant of the regression) and the parental income gradient.
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Furthermore, the quintile-based measures of intergenerational mobility are also very sim-
ilar across specifications. Measuring income as in Figure 2.1 (no adjustment for household
size) results in estimates of Q1 = .257 and Q5/Q1 = 2.47. Measuring income as in Figure 2.2
(income per household member) results in estimates of Q1 = .237 and Q5/Q1 = 2.67. Mea-
suring income as in Figure B.5 (equivalence scale income) results in estimates of Q1 = .243
and Q5/Q1 = 2.63.
At the national level, our estimates of measures of intergenerational mobility are hence
very similar for the three different income measures. In all Sections following Section 2.6.2,
we present all results based on the income measure used in Figure 2.2, parental income
per household member. The use of this income measure is motivated mainly by the fact
that the relationship between educational attainment of the child and parental income is
best described by a linear relationship when using this income measure. This allows us
to compare intergenerational mobility across regions parsimoniously based on the fit of
Equation 2.1. We obtain very similar results when using the two other income measures.
2.6.2 Comparison to Other Estimates of Intergenerational Mobil-
ity
Based on the linear fit in Figure 2.1, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in
the parental income rank is associated with an increase in the share of children with an
A-Level degree of 4.5 percentage points28. Chetty et al. (2014) find that in the United
States a 10 percentage point increase in parental income rank is associated with an increase
in the share of children who attend college by 6.7 percentage points. This suggests that
the association between parental income rank and child educational outcomes is weaker in
Germany, compared to the US. However, this comparison is of course rather an indirect
one, as both outcomes are different. While college attendance in the US and an A-Level
degree in Germany are, of course, not the same outcome, we choose this comparison as both
measures focus on the educational attainment of children. Hence this should not be viewed
a direct comparison of intergenerational mobility of both countries, as the institutional
setting is different. Furthermore, we expect that the parental income gradient for college
attendance in Germany should be higher than the parental income gradient for obtaining an
28For the comparison here, we use income not adjusted for household size as income measure, to use the
same income measure as Chetty et al. (2014) for the comparison with their results.
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A-Level degree. The particular institutional setting of our study prevents us to make a clear
comparison to other countries. We rather focus on studying how intergenerational mobility
differs across different regions in Germany, as the institutional setting is much more similar
across regions within Germany.
2.6.3 Robustness of National Results
In Table 2.3, we present the estimates of intergenerational mobility we obtain at the
national level when we use different age cut-offs for children to define our sample. When
using different age-cutoffs we also re-calculate income percentile ranks, i.e. we define income
ranks always as the rank relative to other households within the sample. Here, we always
use income per household member as our income measure. In addition to our measures of
intergenerational mobility, we also report the A-Level share for the different age groups in
our sample, and the sample size. For convenience, we also re-state the results we obtain
when using our baseline sample, children aged 16 to 22.
Table 2.3: Intergenerational Mobility Measures using Different Age Cut-Offs
Sample Sample Size A-Level Share Q1 α β × 100 Q5/Q1
Children aged 16 - 22 268523 .403 .237 .166 .485 2.67
Children aged 16 - 19 171441 .369 .209 .137 .465 2.81
Children aged 17 - 20 163903 .432 .254 .179 .508 2.63
Children aged 20 - 22 97082 .465 .281 .205 .521 2.51
This Table present the estimates of intergenerational mobility we obtain at the national level when
we use different age cut-offs for children to define our sample.
When using older children, the (unconditional) A-Level share in our sample becomes
higher, as already noted before. Our estimates of the parental income gradient are increasing
in the age cut-offs, as well as our estimates of the baseline probability. This suggests that
we slightly underestimate both, the parental income gradient and the baseline probability,
at the national level in our main sample, compared to estimates we obtain when using older
children. However, one should also keep in mind that the estimates based on older children
are also based on a more selected sample, as we can link less children to their parents for these
age groups (see Table 2.1). We also note that for all age groups, the relationship between
parental income rank and the probability of obtaining an A-Level is well approximated by
a linear function, as can be seen in Figures B.6, B.7 and B.8 in the Appendix. The main
focus of our analysis lies in the comparison of intergenerational mobility across regions. Our
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regional estimates of intergenerational mobility are robust to the use of different age-cutoffs,
as we show in Section 2.8.7.
2.7 Differences in Intergenerational Mobility between
Groups
Before turning to regional differences in intergenerational mobility at a granular level,
we analyze differences in intergenerational mobility between (broadly defined) groups in
Germany at the national level. The goal of this analysis is twofold. First, we want to
provide a comprehensive description of intergenerational mobility in Germany. Second,
this analysis provides evidence that the relationship between parental income and child
educational attainment is indeed well described by a linear approximation, not only at the
most aggregate level, but also for different subgroups of the population. As noted before, in
all comparisons we use parental income per household member as our income measure. In all
comparisons, income percentiles always refer to the percentiles in the national (aggregate)
income distributions29.
2.7.1 The Role of Gender
In Figure 2.3 we separately report estimates of intergenerational mobility for boys and
girls. We find a rather large difference in the baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level
degree (i.e. the constant of the linear fit). The baseline probability is estimated at α = 0.215
for girls, and α = 0.125 for boys, respectively. This means that baseline probability of
obtaining an A-Level is 9 percentage points higher for girls. This difference is nearly constant
(but slightly widening) across the income distribution, as indicated by the fact that parental
income gradients are rather similar (but slightly higher for boys): β × 100 = 0.49 for girls,
compared to β × 100 = 0.47 for boys.
A similar picture emerges when we compare quintile-based mobility measures between
both groups. We find Q1 = .284 for girls and Q1 = .198 for boys, again indicating a roughly
9 percentage point difference in the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between both
groups. When calculating our second measure of relative mobility, we find Q5/Q1 = 2.40
29i.e. percentiles are not calculated based on group-specific income distributions, but the same for all
groups.
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for girls and Q5/Q1 = 2.98 for boys, reflecting the differences in the baseline probability
between both groups.
Figure 2.3: Differences by Gender
(a) Girls (b) Boys
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis),
separate by gender of the child. The Figures are constructed by binning parent rank into one-
percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-22
currently enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it
among all children in this bin vs. the parent rank for each bin. The left Figure (girls) is based on
N = 124121 observations, the right Figure (boys) is based on N = 144402 observations. For girls,
the slope and constant of the OLS regression in the underlying micro-data (black line) are 0.0049
and 0.215, for boys the slope and constant are 0.0047 and 0.125.
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2.7.2 The Role of Parental Education
In Figure 2.4 we separately report the association between parental income and child
educational outcomes for children with different parental education levels. Specifically, we
report results separately for children from households where no parent has an A-Level degree
(left Panel in Figure 2.4) and for children from households where at least one parent has
an A-Level degree (right Panel in Figure 2.4). We find a large difference in the baseline
probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between the two groups. For children with parents
without A-Level degree, the baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree themselves
is α = 0.16, whereas the baseline probability for children with at least one parent with
an A-Level degree is α = 0.44, more than twice as high. Remarkably, this difference is
basically constant across the whole income distribution, the parental income gradients of
the two different groups are nearly identical: β×100 = 0.3018 for children without parental
A-Level degree and β × 100 = 0.3068 for children with parental A-Level degree.
We obtain very similar results when calculating quintile-based measures of intergenera-
tional mobility. We find Q1 = .192 for children where neither parent has an A-Level degree,
and Q1 = .496 for children where at least one parent has an A-Level degree, again indicating
a nearly 30 percentage point gap in the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between
both groups.
Due to the high baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for children where
at least one parent has an A-Level degree, our second measure of relative mobility, the
Q5/Q1 ratio is rather low for these children. For children where at least one parent has
an A-Level degree, we estimate Q5/Q1 = 1.46. For children where neither parent has an
A-Level degree, we estimate Q5/Q1 = 2.24, reflecting the flattening of the parental income
gradient once parental education is taken into account.
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Figure 2.4: Differences by Parental Education
(a) Neither Parent has an A-Level Degree (b) At Least One Parent With A-Level Degree
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis),
separate by parental education levels. The Figures are constructed by binning parent rank into
one-percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-
22 currently enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed
it among all children in this bin vs. the parent rank for each bin. The left Figure (parents without
A-Level degree) is based on N = 177766 observations, the right Figure (at least one parent has an
A-Level degree) is based on N = 90757 observations. For children whose parents do not have an
A-Level degree, the slope and constant of the OLS regression in the underlying micro-data (black
line) are 0.0030 and 0.160, for children where at least one parent has an A-Level degree the slope
and constant are 0.0030 and 0.440.
2.7.3 Migrants and Natives
In Figure 2.5, we separately report the association between parental income and child’s
educational attainment for children with migrational background (”Migrationshintergrund”,
right Panel in Figure 2.5) and children without migrational background (left Panel in Figure
2.5). Here, we loosely refer to children with migrational background as migrants, and
children without migrational background as natives.
The baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree is slightly higher for children
with migrational background (α = 0.19 for migrants and α = 0.15 for natives). The reverse
is true for the parental income gradient. We estimate β × 100 = 0.44 for migrants and
β × 100 = 0.50 for natives.
Based on the linear fit, the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree is higher for children
with migrational background (compared to children without migrational background) in the
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bottom half of the income distribution, whereas the reverse is true in the upper half of the
income distribution.
We obtain similar results when calculating quintile-based measures of intergenerational
mobility. We find Q1 = .248 for migrants and Q1 = .229 for natives, again indicating a
slightly higher baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for migrants.
Due to the higher baseline probability and the lower slope for migrants, we estimate a
(slightly) lower Q5/Q1 measure for migrants, compared to natives. We find Q5/Q1 = 2.58
for migrants, and Q5/Q1 = 2.76 for natives
It is noteworthy that conditional on parental income, the probability of obtaining an A-
Level degree is identical (or even higher) for children with migrational background, compared
to children without migrational background.
Figure 2.5: Differences by Migrational Background
(a) No Migrational Background (b) Migrational Background
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis),
separate by migrational background. The Figures are constructed by binning parent rank into
one-percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-
22 currently enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed
it among all children in this bin vs. the parent rank for each bin. The left Figure (no migrational
background) is based on N = 200465 observations, the right Figure (migrational background) is
based on N = 68058 observations. For children without migrational background, the slope and
constant of the OLS regression in the underlying micro-data (black line) are 0.0050 and 0.152, for
children with migrational background the slope and constant are 0.0044 and 0.190.
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2.7.4 East Germany and West Germany
Lastly, before turning to a granular regional analysis, we report differences in the associ-
ation between parental income and child’s educational attainment between East- and West
Germany30. Households are assigned to either part of the country based on the current
place of residence.
Results of this comparison are reported in Figure 2.6. The baseline probability is α =
0.138 in East Germany and α = 0.166 in West Germany. The parental income gradient
is β × 100 = 0.55 in East Germany and β × 100 = 0.47 in West Germany. Remarkably,
the parental income gradient is substantially higher in East Germany, compared to West
Germany.
Based on the linear fit, the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree is higher for
children from West Germany in the bottom tertile of the income distribution, whereas the
probability of obtaining an A-Level degree is higher for children from East Germany in the
two top tertiles of the national income distribution.
We obtain similar results when calculating quintile-based measures of intergenerational
mobility. We find Q1 = .202 in East Germany and Q1 = .240 in West Germany, again
indicating higher levels of absolute mobility in West Germany.
Consistent with the other results, we estimate Q5/Q1 = 3.22 in East Germany and
Q5/Q1 = 2.61 in West Germany, indicating a higher degree of relative mobility in West
Germany.
30We exclude Berlin from this comparison, as it not possible to distinguish between East- and West Berlin
in our data.
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Figure 2.6: Differences between East Germany and West Germany
(a) West Germany (b) East Germany
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank of their parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis),
separate by place of residence. The Figures are constructed by binning parent rank into one-
percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-22
currently enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it
among all children in this bin vs. the parent rank for each bin. The left Figure (West Germany)
is based on N = 230366 observations, the right Figure (East Germany) is based on N = 29545
observations. For children living in West Germany, the slope and constant of the OLS regression
in the underlying micro-data (black line) are 0.0047 and 0.166, for children living in East Germany
the slope and constant are 0.0055 and 0.138.
2.8 Regional Variation in Intergenerational Mobility
We now turn to a detailed characterization of regional differences in intergenerational
mobility across Germany. First, we describe the geographical units of our regional analysis
and describe how we assign children to geographical units. Next, we present estimates of
absolute and relative mobility for our geographical units.
2.8.1 Geographical Units
We characterize regional differences in intergenerational mobility at the level of local labor
markets (LLM). The Federal Institute for Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Research
(”Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung”) defines 258 local labor market
regions in Germany. Local labor markets are a strict aggregation of the 401 German counties
(”Kreise”), with each county being contained in exactly one local labor market. Local labor
markets are defined on the basis of the distribution of regional economic activity (on the
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basis of commuting patterns), and strict subsets of German states (with the exceptions of
the five local labor markets Bremen, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Mannheim and Ulm)31. The
definition is conceptually similar to the definition of commuting zones in the US, used e.g.
by Chetty et al. (2014).
We assign households to the local labor market of their current place of main residence
reported in our data. That is, we assign households to the local labor market they reside
in at the time they are observed in the MZ. We use the current place of residence as our
measure of household location, as we are not able to track household movements over time.
Conceptually, this is very similar to the approach in Chetty et al. (2014), who use the place of
residence of a child at the age of 15 (for most children) as main geographical indicator. The
median number of children in our sample (observations) per LLM is 649 (mean: 1040). The
lowest number of observations across all LLM’s is 162 (in the LLM Sonneberg in Thuringia),
the largest number of observations is 9299 (in the LLM Stuttgart in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg).
In Figure 2.7, we present a heatmap of unconditional A-Level shares for children in our
sample, i.e. the fraction of children with an A-Level degree (according to our definition) in
our sample calculated separately for every local labor market in Germany. In all heatmaps,
we always use dark colors to indicate a low level of intergenerational mobility and light
colors to indicate high levels of intergenerational mobility.
Figure 2.7 reveals that there is substantial variation in (unconditional) A-Level shares
across local labor markets. In some local markets, the share of children obtaining an A-
Level degree is as low as 17%, whereas in other local labor markets more than 50% of
children obtain an A-Level degree. While A-Level shares differ between local labor markets
within federal states (”Bundesla¨nder”), we observe clustering at the state-level. A-Level
shares are rather low in Bavaria and in Saxony-Anhalt and high in Berlin, Brandenburg and
North-Rhine Westfalia.
Roughly 50% of the variation in the unconditional A-Level shares across LLMs is due
to within-state variation in the unconditional A-Level shares32. While these numbers re-
veal nothing about intergenerational mobility per se, they help to interpret our results for
intergenerational mobility reported in the following Sections.
31More information can be found on the website of the relevant federal institute, available at
https://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Raumbeobachtung/Raumabgrenzungen/AMR/Arbeitsmarktregionen.html.
32This calculation is based on a regression of the A-Level share in each LLM on a set of state-level dummy
variables. This analysis uses only LLMs that are strict subsets of states, i.e. the 5 LLMs that cross state
boundaries are excluded from this analysis. The R-squared of this regression is R2 = 0.507, meaning that
roughly 50% of the variation in unconditional A-Level shares is due to between state variation.
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Figure 2.7: A-Level Shares Across LLM’s in Germany
This Figure shows the fraction of children in our sample that either have an A-Level degree or are
enrolled in the last two/three years of school leading to an A-Level degree among all children in
the sample, calculated separately for every local labor market in Germany.
2.8.2 Relative Intergenerational Mobility
Figure 2.8 presents the regional variation in our first measure of relative mobility, the
parental income gradient. The estimates of the parental income gradient at the LLM-level
are obtained by estimating Regression 2.1 separately for each LLM l:
Yi,l = αl + βlRi + i,l (2.8)
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where Yi,l denotes our binary outcome variable of a child i living in LLM l with parental
income rank Ri
33.
Figure 2.8 reveals substantial heterogeneity in the parental income gradient across re-
gions: While in some regions, β × 100 is estimated to be as low as 0.1, in other regions we
estimate β × 100 to be as high as 0.7. This means that in some regions the difference in
the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from the very top of and
the very bottom in the national income distribution is only 10 percentage points, whereas
this difference is as high as 70 percentage points in other regions. The magnitude of the
regional variation in our estimates of the parental income gradient is roughly comparable to
the magnitude of the regional variation in rank-rank slopes and college attendance slopes
across commuting zones in the US reported in Chetty et al. (2014).
Our estimates of the parental income gradient are generally higher in East Germany,
compared to West Germany, corroborating the finding reported in Figure 2.6. Parental
income gradients are especially high in Saxony and in Thuringia. Apart from that, no clear
regional pattern at the state-level emerges for the parental income gradient. Even within in
the same state, substantial variation in the parental income gradient exists: only 14% of the
variation in the parental income gradient across LLMs is due to between state variation34.
33The parental income rank is the rank in the national income distribution. To stress this, we drop the
subscript l on the parental income rank.
34Calculated as the R2 of a regression of the parental income at the LLM level on a set of state dummies
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Figure 2.8: Parental Income Gradient Across LLM’s in Germany
This Figure shows the estimates of the parental income gradient, estimated separately for every
local labor market in Germany.
Figure 2.9 presents our second measure of relative Intergenerational Mobility, the Q5/Q1
ratio, which is the ratio of the share of children obtaining an A-Level degree from the top
quintile of the income distribution and the share of children obtaining an A-Level degree
from the bottom quintile of the income distribution. At the national level, the Q5/Q1
ratio is 2.67. Again, there is substantial variation across local labor markets. In some local
labor markets, the Q5/Q1 ratio is as low as 1.3 (meaning that the relative likelihood to
obtain an A-Level degree is 1.3 times higher for children from the top quintile of the income
distribution compared to children from the bottom quintile of the income distribution),
in other local labor markets the Q5/Q1 ratio is as high as 7 (meaning that the relative
likelihood to obtain an A-Level degree is 7 times higher for children from the top quintile
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of the income distribution compared to children from the bottom quintile of the income
distribution). Around 20% of the observed variation in the Q5/Q1 ratio between LLM’s is
due to between state variation.
Figure 2.9: Q5/Q1 Ratio Across LLM’s in Germany
This Figure shows estimates of the Q5/Q1 ratio (i.e. the ratio of the share of children obtaining an
A-Level degree among children in the top quintile of the income distribution and the share of chil-
dren obtaining an A-Level degree among children the bottom quintile of the income distribution),
calculated separately for every local labor market in Germany.
The Q5/Q1 ratio is generally higher in regions with low (unconditional) A-Level shares
in our sample (e.g. Bavaria) and lower in regions with high A-Level shares (e.g. Northrhine-
Westfalia). Indeed, there is a negative correlation between the Q5/Q1 ratio and the uncondi-
tional A-Level share presented in Figure 2.7 of −0.41 across LLMs (the population-weighted
correlation is −0.53 and the (Spearman) rank correlation is −0.40). The correlation of the
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different measures of intergenerational mobility across local labor markets is explored in
detail in Section 2.8.5.
2.8.3 Absolute Intergenerational Mobility
This Section reports the results for the estimates of the absolute intergenerational mobil-
ity measures. In Figure 2.10, we report the results for the Q1 measure, the share of children
obtaining an A-Level degree from households in the bottom quintile of the national income
distribution. Results for our second measure of absolute mobility, the constants estimated
in regression 2.8, are relegated to Figure B.9 in the Appendix, as the correlation between
both measures is very high (ρ = 0.87).
We find substantial differences in the Q1 measure across local labor markets. At the
national level, 23% of children from the bottom quintile of the income distribution obtain
an A-Level degree (i.e. Q1 = 0.23). In some regions, only 5% of children from the bottom
quintile of the national income distribution obtain an A-Level degree, a substantially lower
share of children than at the national average. In other regions, 40% of children from the
bottom quintile of the national income distribution obtain an A-Level degree. Roughly 40%
of the variation in the Q1 measure across LLM’s is due to between state-variation in the
Q1 measure.
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Figure 2.10: Q1 Measure Across LLM’s in Germany
This Figure shows estimates of Q1 measure (i.e. the share of children obtaining an A-Level degree
among children with parents in the bottom quintile of the national income distribution), calculated
separately for every local labor market in Germany.
2.8.4 Intergenerational Mobility in the Largest LLM’s
In this Section, we present estimates of absolute and relative mobility for the 25 largest
local labor markets35 in detail in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 shows that there is considerable variation in our measures of intergenerational
mobility across major urban areas in Germany. In the most (absolutely) mobile urban local
labor markets, more than 30% of children from the bottom quintile of the income distribution
obtain an A-Level degree (Column 5 in Table 2.4, which reports the Q1 measure). In the
35Measured by total population in 2015. In all local labor markets reported in Table 2.4, we observe more
than 1500 children in our sample.
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least (absolutely) mobile major urban areas, this share is as low as 9%. Many urban local
labor markets in North Rhine Westphalia exhibit high degrees of absolute intergenerational
mobility, whereas urban LLM’s in Bavaria (and Leipzig in Saxony) exhibit a very low degree
of absolute intergenerational mobility.
Table 2.4 also shows that there is substantial variation in the parental income gradient
across urban local labor markets (Column 6, which reports the parental income gradient).
The parental income gradient varies between .431 (in Dresden, lowest parental income gra-
dient of the 25 local labor markets reported here) and .605 (in Leipzig, highest parental
income gradient of the urban LLM’s reported here). Coincidentally, Dresden and Leipzig
are both located in the federal state of Saxony, illustrating that the parental income gradient
exhibits substantial variation even within the same state36.
Results for the urban LLM’s reported in Table 2.4 also illustrate the fact that a high
degree of absolute mobility does not necessarily imply a high degree of relative mobility.
Out of the 25 urban LLM’s reported here, the absolute mobility rank of Dresden (based on
the Q1 measure) is 17 (out of 25), whereas Dresden has the lowest parental income gradient
of the 25 LLM’s reported here. Another example is Berlin, which has an absolute mobility
rank of 12, but the second highest parental income gradient (out of the 25 LLM’s reported
here).
The second measure of relative mobility, the Q5/Q1 ratio exhibits substantial variation
across the largest LLM’s as well. In Essen (lowest Q5/Q1 ratio out of the 25 LLM’s here),
children from the top quintile of the income distribution are twice as likely as children from
the bottom of the income distribution to have an A-Level degree. In Augsburg, they are
6 times as likely. Differences in the Q5/Q1 ratio are mainly driven by differences in the
probability to obtain an A-Level degree for children in the bottom quintile of the income
distribution for the 25 LLM’s reported here. The Q5/Q1 ratio goes hand in hand with the
Q1 measure for the local labor markets reported in Table 2.4, the correlation between both
measures is ρ = −0.918 for the 25 LLM’s reported in the Table.
The results reported in Table 2.4 are limited to large (urban) local labor markets. In the
next Section, we discuss the relationship between our different measures of intergenerational
mobility across all 258 local labor markets in Germany to shed light on the question whether
absolute and relative mobility go hand in hand.
36Another example that illustrates this are e.g. Freiburg and Heidelberg.
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Table 2.4: Mobility Measures for the 25 Largest Local Labor Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Rank LLM Name Population A-Level Share Q1 β × 100 Q5/Q1
1 Bonn 915022 0.54 0.35 0.47 2.19
2 Essen 751902 0.50 0.34 0.45 2.08
3 Du¨sseldorf 1545483 0.53 0.33 0.52 2.24
4 Mu¨nster 805871 0.46 0.32 0.45 2.17
5 Frankfurt/Main 2238027 0.51 0.32 0.52 2.30
6 Hamburg 2850118 0.49 0.32 0.45 2.16
7 Duisburg 1164829 0.46 0.31 0.46 2.27
8 Potsdam-Brandenburg 608465 0.59 0.30 0.52 2.52
9 Ko¨ln 1809968 0.47 0.30 0.50 2.37
10 Karlsruhe 743596 0.47 0.30 0.53 2.26
11 Freiburg 645818 0.41 0.29 0.45 2.23
12 Berlin 3520031 0.48 0.28 0.56 2.70
13 Dortmund 1161613 0.44 0.28 0.53 2.59
14 Heidelberg 698126 0.50 0.27 0.55 2.62
15 Gelsenkirchen 1151169 0.42 0.27 0.48 2.55
16 Bremen 747366 0.47 0.27 0.56 2.76
17 Dresden 791237 0.40 0.27 0.43 2.15
18 Stuttgart 2482676 0.43 0.26 0.47 2.43
19 Hannover 1144481 0.42 0.23 0.53 2.89
20 Kiel 724185 0.43 0.21 0.52 3.26
21 Saarbru¨cken 658124 0.38 0.19 0.51 3.09
22 Mu¨nchen 2731249 0.40 0.16 0.53 3.59
23 Leipzig 1016485 0.35 0.16 0.61 3.96
24 Nu¨rnberg 1081648 0.30 0.12 0.52 4.32
25 Augsburg 662890 0.32 0.09 0.52 6.01
This Table reports estimates of absolute and relative mobility for the 25 largest LLM’s in Germany
(measured by total population in 2015). Local labor markets are sorted in descending order by
absolute mobility rank (measured using the Q1 measure). The first column, labeled Q1 Rank,
reports the rank of the LLM based on the Q1 measure relative to the other LLM’s reported in the
Table.
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2.8.5 The Relationship Between Different Measures of Intergen-
erational Mobility
In this Section, we discuss the relationship between our measures of relative and absolute
mobility across all LLM’s in Germany. Are regions of high relative mobility also regions of
high absolute mobility? In order to answer this question, we investigate the relationship of
our estimates of relative and absolute mobility across local labor markets.
For the purpose of comparing intergenerational mobility across all 258 local labor mar-
kets, we additionally report the results for a third measure of relative mobility: the difference
in the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from the top quintile of
the income distribution and children from the bottom quintile of the income distribution:
Q5−Q1 = E(Yi = 1|Ri ≥ 80)− E(Yi = 1|Ri < 20) (2.9)
We refer to this measure as Q5−Q1. Conceptually, this measure is similar to the parental
income gradient, but does not rely on the assumption that the relationship between parental
income rank and a child’s probability to obtain an A-Level degree is well approximated by
a linear function in all regions. Hence the Q5 − Q1 measure serves as a robustness check
for the results we obtain when comparing the parental income gradient across local labor
markets.
The correlation between the different income-based measures of intergenerational mobil-
ity across LLM’s is reported in Table 2.5. In Table 2.5, we report the correlation ρ (un-
weighted, and weighted by the number of observations in each LLM) and the (spearman)
rank correlation r of different intergenerational mobility measures across LLM’s (treating
each LLM as one observation). In addition to the correlation between our measures of
absolute and relative mobility, we also report the correlation of these measures with the
unconditional A-Level share in every LLM.
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Table 2.5: Correlation between Intergenerational Mobility Measures Across Local Labor Markets
Intergen. Correlation Q1 α β × 100 Q5−Q1 Q5/Q1 A-Level Share
Mob. Measure
Q1
ρ 1 0.87 -0.26 -0.22 -0.78 0.73
ρ (weighted) 1 0.91 -0.18 -0.15 -0.82 0.80
r 1 0.88 -0.24 -0.21 -0.83 0.73
α
ρ * 1 -0.41 -0.32 -0.76 0.70
ρ (weighted) * 1 -0.29 -0.19 -0.78 0.78
r * 1 -0.39 -0.31 -0.82 0.71
β × 100
ρ * * 1 0.86 0.55 0.27
ρ (weighted) * * 1 0.87 0.45 0.26
r * * 1 0.84 0.61 0.23
Q5−Q1
ρ * * * 1 0.55 0.28
ρ (weighted) * * * 1 0.47 0.27
r * * * 1 0.65 0.23
Q5/Q1
ρ * * * * 1 -0.41
ρ (weighted) * * * * 1 -0.53
r * * * * 1 -0.40
This Table reports the correlation between estimates of different measures of intergenerational
mobility across LLM’s in Germany. ρ denotes the (Pearson) correlation coefficient of two measures
across LLM’s. ρ (weighted) denotes the (Pearson) correlation coefficient of two measures across
LLM’s weighted by the number of observations in each LLM. r denotes the (Spearman) rank
correlation coefficient of two measures across LLM’s.
First, we note that the correlation between quintile-based and regression based measures
that are conceptually similar is very high. The correlation between the Q1 measure and
the baseline probability α estimated from Regression 2.8 is very high across LLM’s. Also
the correlation between the parental income gradient β × 100 and the Q5 − Q1 measure
is substantial. This reassures us that the relationship between the probability of a child
obtaining an A-Level degree and parent income rank is indeed well approximated by a
linear function in all LLM’s.
The relationship between absolute mobility and relative mobility across LLM’s is of
moderate size. It is true that, on average, LLM’s with a higher degree of upward mobility
(high Q1 or high α) are also LLM’s with a higher degree of relative mobility (low parental
income gradient, or low Q5−Q1 measure), but this relationship is far from perfect. Across
all LLM’s, it is not true that absolute and relative mobility go ”hand in hand”, when
measuring relative mobility by the parental income gradient or by the Q5 − Q1 measure.
The correlations reported here are, for example, lower than the cross-commuting zones
correlation of absolute and relative mobility reported in Chetty et al. (2014). Chetty et al.
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(2014) report a correlation of−0.61 between their measures of absolute and relative mobility.
This means that in Germany the existence of regions described by low absolute mobility and
high relative mobility is not uncommon. For example, the local labor market of Burghausen
in Bavaria is described by low absolute mobility (α = 0.11, Q1 = 0.15), but also by high
relative mobility, i.e. a low parental income gradient (β × 100 = .23, Q5 − Q1 = .20). An
example of a LLM that exhibits high absolute mobility, but low relative mobility is Berlin.
Berlin is described by relatively high absolute mobility (α = 0.23, Q1 = 0.28), but at the
same time by relatively low relative mobility, i.e. a high parental income gradient (β×100 =
0.56, Q5−Q1 = 0.47). These results highlight the importance of the exact normative concept
one has in mind when comparing intergenerational mobility across regions. It might well be
the case that a local labor market has low relative mobility, but high absolute mobility, or
vice versa.
The Q5/Q1 ratio exhibits a strong correlation with both, measures of absolute mobility
(a negative one) and other measures of relative mobility (a positive one). By construction,
the Q5/Q1 measure depends on both, so this strong relation is not unexpected.
LLM’s with higher unconditional A-Level shares are on average also described by higher
measures of absolute mobility - a higher A-Level share ”lifts all the boats” (although part
of this correlation is, of course, mechanical). Interestingly, LLM’s with higher unconditional
A-Level shares are also described by higher parental income gradients, but this correlation
is rather moderate.
The results reported in Table 2.5 highlight the importance of the exact normative concept
one has in mind when comparing intergenerational mobility across LLM’s in Germany.
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2.8.6 Comparison with Educational Intergenerational Mobility
Our analysis so far has focused on the relationship between parental income and the
educational attainment of children. In this Section, we analyze how regional variation
in our measures of intergenerational mobility compares to regional variation in measures
of intergenerational mobility that are based on the association between parent and child
education levels.
For the purpose of this comparison, we define three measures of intergenerational mobility
that are based on the association between the educational attainment of children and the
educational attainment of their parents.
The first measure we consider is the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for chil-
dren where neither parent has obtained an A-Level degree. We refer to this measure as
Educational Upward Mobility.
Educational Upward Mobility = E(Yi = 1|Neither Parent has an A-Level degree) (2.10)
Conceptually, this measure resembles our measures of absolute mobility. We refer to this
measure as educational upward mobility. The heatmap presenting the distribution of this
measure across LLM’s is shown in Figure 2.11. At the national level, our measure of Edu-
cational Upward Mobility is given by .283 (i.e. 28.3% of children where neither parent has
an A-Level degree obtain an A-Level degree).
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Figure 2.11: Educational Upward Mobility Across LLM’s
This Figure shows Educational Upward Mobility across LLM’s. Educational Upward Mobility is
defined as the fraction of children who obtain an A-Level degree among children where neither
parent has an A-Level degree.
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The second measure we consider is the difference in the probability of obtaining an A-
Level degree between children where at least one parent has an A-Level degree and children
where neither parent has an A-Level degree. We refer to this measure as Education Gradient.
Education Gradient
= E(Yi = 1|At least one parent has an A-Level)− E(Yi = 1|Neither Parent has an A-Level)
(2.11)
Conceptually, this measure resembles the parental income gradient (and the Q5−Q1 mea-
sure). The heatmap presenting the distribution of this measure across LLM’s is shown in
Figure 2.12. At the national level, the Education Gradient is given by .355 (i.e. the prob-
ability of obtaining an A-Level degree of a child is 35.5 percentage points higher when at
least one parent has an A-Level degree, compared to a child where neither parent has an
A-Level degree).
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Figure 2.12: Education Gradient Across LLM’s
This Figure shows the Education Gradient across LLM’s. The Education Gradient is defined as
the difference in the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree between children where at least
one parent has an A-Level degree and children where neither parent has an A-Level degree.
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The third (and last) measure of educational mobility we report is the relative likelihood
of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from parents with an A-Level degree and
children from parents without an A-Level degree. We refer to this measure as Education
Ratio.
Education Ratio =
E(Yi = 1|At least one parent has an A-Level)
E(Yi = 1|Neither Parent has an A-Level degree) (2.12)
Conceptually, this measure resembles our Q5/Q1 measure. At the national level, the educa-
tion ratio is given by 2.25. The heatmap presenting the distribution of this measure across
LLM’s is shown in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Education Ratio Across LLM’s
This Figure shows the Education Ratio across LLM’s. The Education Ratio is defined as the
relative likelihood of obtaining an A-Level degree between children from parents with an A-Level
degree and children from parents without an A-Level degree
Generally, the results we obtain for education based measures of intergenerational mobil-
ity at the national level are very similar to the results reported in Riphahn and Tru¨bswetter
(2013) and Klein et al. (2019) for similar measures. It is also worth noting that the regional
variation reported here is larger than the variation in similar measures over time, as reported
by Riphahn and Tru¨bswetter (2013) and Klein et al. (2019).
In Table 2.6 we report the correlation between the different income-based and education-
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based measures of intergenerational mobility across LLM’s. In Table 2.6, we report the
correlation ρ (unweighted, and weighted by the number of observations in each LLM) and
the (Spearman) rank correlation r across LLM’s, treating every LLM as one observation.
The correlation between measures that are conceptually similar are printed in bold.
Table 2.6: Correlation between Income-Based and Education-Based Measures of Intergenera-
tional Mobility Across LLM’s
Education-Based Correlation Q1 α β × 100 Q5−Q1 Q5/Q1
Measures Measure
Educational Upward
ρ 0.71 0.76 0.16 0.17 -0.45
ρ (weighted) 0.80 0.84 0.13 0.16 -0.58
Mobility r 0.73 0.77 0.11 0.12 -0.45
Education Gradient
ρ -0.06 -0.21 0.38 0.34 0.21
ρ (weighted) -0.05 -0.17 0.40 0.37 0.19
r -0.06 -0.19 0.40 0.33 0.22
Education Ratio
ρ -0.53 -0.64 0.10 0.07 0.47
ρ (weighted) -0.64 -0.72 0.09 0.05 0.58
r -0.52 -0.63 0.11 0.26 0.42
This Table reports the correlation between different parental education-based measures of inter-
generational mobility and different parental income-based measures of intergenerational mobility
across LLM’s in Germany. Correlations printed in bold indicate that measures are conceptually
similar.
The results reported in Table 2.6 show that regional patterns in intergenerational mobil-
ity are generally rather similar, regardless of whether intergenerational mobility measures
are based on parental income or on parental education levels. LLM’s described by high
absolute mobility are - on average - also LLM’s desribed by high educational upward mo-
bility. Similarly, LLM’s described by high parental income gradient are on average also
described by a high education gradient, albeit this correlation is a little weaker compared to
the measures of absolute mobility. The same is true for the Q5/Q1 ratio and the Education
Ratio.
It should also be noted that we also find a rather weak correlation between measures of
absolute mobility and relative mobility across LLM’s when using education-based measures
of intergenerational mobility. The correlation between Educational Upward Mobility and
the Education Gradient across LLM’s is ρ = −0.21 (observation-weighted ρ = −0.20, r =
−0.22). This again highlights the importance of the exact normative concept one has in
mind when comparing intergenerational mobility across regions.
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2.8.7 Robustness of Regional Patterns
In this Section, we present evidence on the robustness of our results for geographical
variation in our measures of intergenerational mobility.
One potential concern with our regional comparisons is that the general price level might
differ across regions. As a consequence, real income difference across regions might be
masked when not adjusting for price level differences37, leading to an overestimation of the
parental income gradient in regions with low price levels. Weinand and von Auer (2019)
calculate regional price level indices across German counties based official German CPI
microdata from May 2016. They find that the average price level in the most expensive
county (Munich) is 27 percent higher than the price level in the cheapest county and that
price level differences are mainly driven by differences in housing costs. To address the issue
of regional price level differences, we calculate all income-based measures of intergenerational
mobility based on state-specific income distributions, i.e. we assign every household its
income rank based on the income distribution in its state of residence (instead of the national
income distribution).
Furthermore, we present evidence that regional differences in intergenerational mobility
are not sensitive to the exact age cut-offs. We calculate all measures of regional mobility
for samples only including children ages 16 to 19, 17 to 20 and 20 to 22, the same samples
that are used in Section 2.6.3.
Lastly, we also report all results when using parental income not adjusted for household
size in our main sample (instead of using parental income per capita).
The results of all robustness checks are summarized in Table 2.7. In Table 2.7 we present
the correlation ρ (unweighted, and weighted by the number of observations in each LLM)
and the (Spearman) rank correlation r across LLM’s between our baseline results and the
results of the robustness checks described here.
37For example, a household with a monthly income of 3000 Euro might - in real terms - be richer in
Madgeburg than in Munich.
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Table 2.7: Robustness of Regional Variation
Robustness Check Correlation Measure β × 100 Q1 Q5/Q1 α Q5−Q1
State-Specific
ρ 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.94
ρ (weighted) 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.94
Income Distribution r 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.93
Children Aged 16 to 19
ρ 0.87 0.88 0.74 0.86 0.84
ρ (weighted) 0.86 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.85
r 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.85 0.83
Children Aged 17 to 20
ρ 0.90 0.92 0.84 0.94 0.87
ρ (weighted) 0.89 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.87
r 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.93 0.84
Children Aged 20 to 22
ρ 0.71 0.82 0.59 0.83 0.65
ρ (weighted) 0.69 0.85 0.63 0.87 0.63
r 0.68 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.63
Income not adjusted
ρ 0.88 0.89 0.74 0.93 0.80
ρ (weighted) 0.88 0.92 0.79 0.95 0.79
for HH Size r 0.87 0.89 0.82 0.93 0.78
This Table reports the correlation of different measures of intergenerational mobility estimated
using different sample specifications with the same measures of intergenerational mobility estimated
from our main sample, calculated across LLMs.
The results reported in Table 2.7 show that our results are robust in various dimensions.
The geographical variation across LLM’s is very similar for all measures of intergenerational
mobility for all robustness checks considered in Table 2.7. All this reassures as that differ-
ences in intergenerational mobility across LLM’s are indeed a robust feature of our data and
not simply driven by noise or measurement error.
Next, we turn to the question to what extent differences in household characteristics can
explain differences in intergenerational mobility across LLM’s.
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2.9 Can Household Characteristics Explain Regional
Differences in Intergenerational Mobility?
In the previous Section, we have documented substantial and robust geographical varia-
tion in different measures of intergenerational mobility across regions in Germany. A natural
question to ask is which factors drive the observed differences in intergenerational mobility.
This Section investigates to what extent observed differences in intergenerational mobility
measures across LLM’s can be explained by differences in household characteristics across
LLM’s.
2.9.1 Household Characteristics and Regional Estimates of Inter-
generational Mobility
In the US, Gallagher et al. (2018) show that household characteristics differ greatly
across commuting zones used in Chetty et al. (2014). Gallagher et al. (2018) suggest that
a substantial share of the geographical variation in the intergenerational mobility measures
reported in Chetty et al. (2014) can be explained by differences in household characteristics
across commuting zones.
Addressing the question to what extent differences in household characteristics can ex-
plain the geographical variation in our mobility measures is highly relevant for the interpre-
tation of our findings. To illustrate the mechanism how regional differences in household
characteristics can potentially create spurious geographical variation in intergenerational
mobility measures, consider the following scenario.
Suppose the true model of intergenerational mobility is given by Equation 2.13:
Yi = α + βRi + γXi + i (2.13)
where Yi is our binary child outcome variable, Ri is parental income rank and Xi denotes
other household (or child) characteristics that affect the educational attainment of a child,
e.g. parental education. Furthermore, suppose that COV (Ri, Xi) 6= 0 and γ 6= 0, i.e. other
household characteristics Xi are correlated with parent income and these characteristics have
an effect on the educational attainment of a child. Additionally suppose that the distribution
of Xi differs across local labor markets l (for example because households sort into different
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local labor markets l based on household characteristics Xi). Importantly, note that none
of the coefficients has a local labor market specific subscript l, i.e. the place of residence
has no effect on the outcome Yi of a child i. If the true model of intergenerational mobility
is given by Equation 2.13, but one instead estimates Equation 2.8 (without controlling for
additional household characteristics), one can find substantial variation in the local labor
market specific coefficient estimates αl and βl, due to the fact that omitted variable bias
differs across local labor markets38. If the true model of intergenerational mobility were
given by Equation 2.13, neighborhood effects would play no role in shaping intergenerational
mobility and explaining geographical differences in intergenerational mobility would boil
down to controlling for differences in family characteristics across local labor markets.
In this Section, we investigate how our local labor market specific estimates of intergen-
erational mobility change once we control for additional household characteristics. As our
data set contains rich information on all household members, it is well suited to study to
what extent geographical variation in our measures of intergenerational mobility is driven
by differences in household characteristics across LLM’s. Before describing the estimation
method, Table 2.8 presents an overview over the additional control variables Xi that we
consider in this Section.
Table 2.8: Additional Household Characteristics
Control Variable Encoding
Household Type Three Categories
Highest Parental Education Level Six Categories
No. of Children in Househild Five Categories
Migrational Background Two Categories
Year Dummies Seven Categories
Gender of the Child Two Categories
This Table reports the household characteristics used as additional control variables in this Section.
All variables are transformed into dummy variables. Encoding denotes the number of (mutually
exclusive) dummy categories for each of the variables.
Here, we describe the variables presented in Table 2.8 in more detail. To control for
differences in the household type, we add three dummy variables indicating the type of
the household (two parent household, single mother household, single father household).
38Keep in mind that we assume that the distribution of Xi differs across local labor markets.
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To control for the highest parental education level, we add six dummies indicating the
highest parental education level. The six parental education dummies are a University
degree dummy, a dummy indicating an A-Level degree + vocational training, a dummy
indicating an A-Level degree without vocational training, a dummy indicating vocational
training but no A-Level, a dummy indicating a secondary school degree without vocational
training and a dummy indicating no degree. Note that this dummy always indicates the
highest education level of either parent39. To control for differences in the number of siblings,
we add five dummies indicating the number of children in the household. These dummies
indicate the presence of one, two, three, four or five or more children in the household,
respectively. We add a dummy variable indicating migrational background, which is defined
as before. Additionally, we add a full set of year dummies, and a dummy variable indicating
the gender of the child.
2.9.2 National Results
Before turning to the results for regional variation, we describe how our estimates of inter-
generational mobility change at the national level when we control for additional household
characteristics.
For the regression-based measures of intergenerational mobility at the national level, we
estimate the coefficients of a regression of the A-Level dummy on parental income rank,
including the additional control variables describe above, i.e. we estimate the regression
described in Equation 2.14:
Yi = α + βRi + γXi + i (2.14)
where Xi denotes the set of additional household-level control variables described above.
Additionally, we calculate the probability of obtaining an A-Level degree for every per-
centile in the national income distribution when controlling for other household character-
istics as specified in Equation 2.15:
Yi = α +
99∑
k=0
θkI(Ri = k) + γXi + i (2.15)
39i.e. if the mother has an university degree and the father has vocational training as highest education
level, we assign this household a university degree dummy.
107
where I(Ri = k) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if child i is in percentile k of
the national parental income distribution, and zero otherwise.
Figure 2.14 illustrates how the relationship between parental income rank and child’s
educational attainment changes at the national level when controlling for additional house-
hold characteristics as described above. The red dots in Figure 2.14 show the relationship
between parental income rank and the educational attainment of a child when not control-
ling for other household characteristics, i.e. the results already presented in Figure 2.2. The
gray dots in Figure 2.14 show the fraction of children in each income percentile calculated
as described in Equation 2.15. Note that in Equation 2.15, the probability to obtain an
A-Level degree does not only depend on the parental income percentile, but also on all
other household characteristics. In Figure 2.14, other household characteristics are fixed to
show a two-parent household, with two children, for a male child, in the year 2009, without
migrational background and the highest parental education level being an A-Level degree
+ vocational training, for all percentiles in the national income distribution. Note that as
other household characteristics enter additively, they shift the probability of obtaining an
A-Level degree equally for children from all percentile ranks equally.
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Figure 2.14: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Controlling for Additional House-
hold Characteristics
This Figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of A-Level track or have already completed it vs. the percentile rank of their
parents in the national net income per household member distribution (x-axis). The red dots depict
the fraction of children aged 16-22 currently enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level
track or having already completed it vs. the parent rank in each percentile bin when not controlling
for additional household characteristics. The gray dots show the fractional of children ages 16-22
currently enrolled in the last two years of the A-Level track or having already completed it vs.
the parent rank in each percentile bin when controlling for additional household characteristics as
described in Equation 2.15. The gray dots fix other household characteristics to show a two-parent
household, with two children, for a male child, in the year 2009, without migrational background
and the highest parental education level being an A-Level degree + vocational training. The Figure
is based on N = 268523 children living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level
dummy on the parent income rank without controlling for other household characteristics (solid
black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0048 and a constant of 0.166. The OLS regression of the A-
Level dummy on the parent income rank when controlling for additional household characteristics
(dashed black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0028 and a constant of 0.321.
Two things should be noted in Figure 2.14. First, when controlling for additional house-
hold characteristics, the relationship between parental income rank and the probability to
obtain an A-Level degree becomes even more linear. Second, the parental income gradient
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shrinks: the parental income gradient β × 100 drops from .485 (shown in the solid black
line) to .287 (shown in the dashed black line).
2.9.3 Regional Results
Next, we turn to the question how controlling for additional household characteristics
changes our estimates of intergenerational mobility at the regional level. We estimate
regression-based measures of intergenerational mobility using Equation 2.16:
Yi,l = αl + βlRi + γXi + i,l (2.16)
As before, i is used to denote children, and l denotes LLM’s. We constrain the effects
of additional household characteristics to be equal in all local labor markets, i.e. γ does
not have a local-labor market specific subscript. A similar approach has been employed
by Chetty et al. (2018) to study differences in intergenerational mobility between different
ethnic groups in the US.
To calculate quintile-based measures of intergenerational mobility, we estimate Equation
2.17:
Yi,l = αl +
5∑
k=1
θlI(Ri ∈ Qk) + γXi + i,l (2.17)
where I(Ri ∈ Qk) is an indicator function, equal to one if child i is in the k − th,
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, quintile of the national parent income distribution, and zero otherwise.
Figure 2.15 shows the scatterplot of the LLM-Specific parental income gradients esti-
mated when not controlling for additional household characteristics (Equation 2.8) on the
X-Axis, and the LLM-specific parental income gradient estimated from Equation 2.16 on
the Y-Axis. The red line shows the linear fit.
As can be seen from Figure 2.15, controlling for additional household characteristics
effects most of the LLM-specific estimates of the parental income gradient equally. The
correlation between the LLM-specific parental income gradients estimated from Equation
2.8 and Equation 2.16 across LLM’s is ρ = 0.92. However, similar to the results obtained at
the national level, controlling for additional household characteristics flattens the parental
income gradient. When not controlling for additional household characteristics, the (un-
weighted) mean of the parental income gradient across LLM’s is .47, whereas it shrinks to
.30 when controlling for additional household characteristics.
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Figure 2.15: Scatterplot of Parental Income Gradients
This Figure shows the scatterplot of LLM-specific parental income gradients estimated when not
controlling for additional household characteristics (X-Axis) and LLM-specific Parental Income
Gradients estimated when controlling for additional household characteristics as described in Equa-
tion 2.16 (Y-Axis)
Table 2.9 summarizes the correlation between the baseline estimates presented in Section
2.8 and the estimates obtained from Equation 2.16 and Equation 2.17 in detail.
Table 2.9: Robustness of Regional Variation - Household Characteristics
Robustness Check Correlation Measure β × 100 Q1 α Q5−Q1
Controlling for Additional ρ 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.93
Household Characteristics ρ (weighted) 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.92
r 0.91 0.97 0.97 0.91
This Table reports the correlation of different measures of intergenerational mobility estimated
when controlling for additional household characteristics with the same measures of intergenera-
tional mobility estimated from our main sample across LLM’s.
Table 2.9 shows that controlling for additional household characteristics has barely any
effect on the LLM-specific estimates we obtain. The correlation between LLM-specific esti-
mates when not controlling for other household characteristics and LLM-specific estimates
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when controlling for additional household characteristics is always larger than 0.9, suggest-
ing that differences in intergenerational mobility across LLM’s are not simply driven by
differences in household characteristics across LLM’s.40 This suggests that neighborhood
effects (i.e. LLM characteristics) play a role in shaping intergenerational mobility and that
differences in intergenerational mobility measures are simply explained by differences in
household characteristics across LLMs. In the next Section, we investigate which LLM
characteristics correlate with intergenerational mobility.
40The comparison of Q5/Q1 measure between both approaches is omitted. All other measures of in-
tergenerational mobility we consider are linear measures, so the comparison between both approaches is
independent of the reference group (i.e. the value of other household characteristics). The Q5/Q1 ratio is
nonlinear in both Q5 and Q1, hence when comparing it between approaches, one would need to make a
comparison for each reference group (i.e. for each possible combination of Xi). This would result in a large
amount of comparisons and is hence omitted.
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2.10 Spatial Correlates of Intergenerational Mobility
In this Section, we take a first step at describing which local labor market characteristics
correlate with our measures of intergenerational mobility. We do not claim that these
correlations should be interpreted as a causal relationship, but they can help to guide future
research in the search for causal determinants of intergenerational mobility.
To construct local labor market characteristics, we use a large set of regional indicators
compiled by the Federal Institute for Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Research (”Bun-
desinstitut fu¨r Stadt-, Bau- und Raumforschung”, in short BBSR). The BBSR maintains
a database of regional indicators (called ”Inkar”), containing around 600 different regional
indicators41, covering statistics on labor market conditions, housing structure and housing
stock, demographics, education, income, debt, environmental indicators, access to medical
services, public finances, social security payments, infrastructure and economic activity at
the level of local labor markets, using the same definition of local labor markets we employ
in our analysis. The data available in the database is collected by the BBSR from various
government bodies in Germany (e.g. the German statistical office DESTATIS and the Insti-
tute for Employment Research IAB). Most variables in the database are available at annual
frequency42.
We use this database to find local labor market characteristics correlated with our mea-
sures of intergenerational mobility. We construct local labor market characteristics as the
time averages of variables over the years 2009 to 2015 at the local labor market level (i.e. for
every variable, for every local labor market, we calculate the average value of the variable
over the years 2009 to 2015 and use this as local labor market characteristic)43. Here, we
take a first step at describing which local market characteristics are correlated with our
measure of intergenerational mobility. To do so, we report the ten local labor market char-
acteristics with the highest (absolute) correlation with our measures of intergenerational
mobility44. We focus on two measures of intergenerational mobility in this Section: The Q1
41The database can be reached under the the website https://www.inkar.de/
42Not all variables are available at annual frequency. Data on election results is e.g. available at the same
frequency as elections take place.
43If a variable is available only for a short time period, we construct the time average using all available
observations instead.
44In reporting the ten local labor market characteristics with the highest correlation, we omit duplications
of local labor market characteristics from the analysis, i.e. local labor market characteristics that are very
similar. For example, our database contains the population share of 6 to 18 years olds, and the population
share of 6 to 20 years olds in every local market. For variables that are very similar, like the two in the
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measure and the parental income gradient β×100. The results of this exercise can be found
in Table 2.10 for the Q1 measure and in Table 2.11 for the parental income gradient.
example here, we only consider one of the variables, namely the one with the higher correlation with the
intergenerational mobility measure.
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Table 2.10: Local Labor Market Characteristics Correlated with the Absolute Mobility Measure
Q1
Rank Local-Labor Market Characteristic ρ r
1 Labor Force Participation, Young People −0.43 −0.43
2 Social Aid Recipients under 18 −0.42 −0.45
3 Share of Employees w/ Vocational Training −0.40 −0.40
4 Vote-Share ”Other Parties” −0.39 −0.38
5 Long-Term Unemployment Share, Males 0.38 0.38
6 Vocational Training Spots −0.37 −0.42
7 Naturalizations per capita 0.35 0.33
8 Open-Space Area −0.35 −0.31
9 Unemployment Rate, Male Foreigners 0.35 .36
10 Long-Term Unemployment Share 0.34 0.34
This Table reports the ten local labor market characteristics available in the database ”Inkar” with
the highest (absolute) correlation with the Q1 measure of intergenerational mobility. Correlations
are calculated across local labor markets, treating every local labor market as one observation.
The column labeled ρ denotes the Pearson correlation, the column labeled r denotes the Spearman
Rank Correlation. Variables are sorted in descending order by absolute correlation ρ with the Q1
measure. The fist column, labeled Rank, denotes the rank of the local labor market characteristic
based on the absolute correlation with the Q1 measure relative to all other local labor market
characteristics in the database. Labor Force Participation, Young People denotes the share of 15
to 30 year olds being employed in a regular working position, among all 15 to 30 year olds (”Quote
Ju¨ngere Bescha¨ftigte”). Social Aid Recipients under 18 denotes the share of social aid recipients
that are younger than 18 among all social aid recipients (”Leistungsempfa¨nger nach SGB XII, Kap.
5-9, unter 18 Jahren”). Share of Employees w/ Vocational Training denotes the share of employess
with vocational training (but no college degree) among all employees (”Anteil Bescha¨ftigte mit
Berufsabschluss”). Vote Share ”Other Parties” denotes the share of votes received by parties not
represented in the Federal Parliament, in the election of the federal parliament (”Stimmenanteil
Sonstige Parteien”). Long-Term Unemployment Share, Males denotes the share of long-term (more
than one year) unemployed males among all unemployed males (”Ma¨nnliche Langzeitarbeitslose”).
Vocational Training Spots denotes the fraction of the number of open and filled vocational training
positions over the number of filled vocational training spots and applicants who did not find a
vocational training position and are not in education (”Ausbildungspla¨tze”). Naturalizations per
capita denotes the number of naturalizations per capita (”Einbu¨rgerungen je Einwohner”). Open-
Space Area denotes the share of the area not occupied by buildings among the total area (”Anteil
Freifa¨che”). Unemployment Rate, Male Foreigners denotes the unemployment rate among male
foreigners (”Ma¨nnliche ausla¨ndische Arbeitslose”). Long-Term Unemployment Share denotes the
share of unemployed persons with an unemployment duration of more than one year, among all
unemployed persons (”Langzeitarbeitslose”).
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Table 2.11: Local Labor Market Characteristics Correlated with the Parental Income Gradient
Rank Local-Labor Market Characteristic ρ r
1 Vote Share ”CDU/CSU” −0.38 −0.35
2 Average Pension Payments 0.37 0.34
3 Share of Female Employees w/ College Degree 0.36 0.41
4 Share of Dwellings w/ 5 or more Rooms −0.35 −0.36
5 Share Marginal Employees, 65 and Older −0.35 −0.36
6 Population Share 6 to 18 Years −0.35 −0.36
7 Share of Young Unemployed −0.35 −0.32
8 Daycare Share under 3-Year Olds 0.34 0.32
9 Share of Dwellings in Detached Houses −0.33 −0.34
10 Share of Employees in Vocational Training −0.33 −0.34
This Table reports the ten local labor market characteristics available in the database ”Inkar” with
the highest (absolute) correlation with the parental income gradient. Correlations are calculated
across local labor markets, treating every local labor market as one observation. The column
labeled ρ denotes the Pearson correlation, the column labeled r denotes the Spearman Rank
Correlation. Variables are sorted in descending order by absolute correlation ρ with the parental
income gradient. The fist column, labeled Rank, denotes the rank of the local labor market
characteristic based on the absolute correlation with the parental income gradient relative to all
other local labor market characteristics in the database. Vote Share ”CDU/CSU” denotes the
share of votes received by the CDU/CSU in the election of the federal parliament (”Stimmenanteil
CDU/CSU”). Average Pension Payments denotes the average yearly pension payments received
by pensioners over 65 (”Durchschnittlicher Rentenzahlbetrag”). Share of Female Employees w/
College Degree denotes the share of female employees with an academic degree among all female
employees (”Quote weibliche Bescha¨ftigte mit akademischem Abschluss”). Share of Dwellings w/ 5
or more Rooms denotes the share of dwelling units with 5 or more rooms among all dwelling units
(”Anteil 5- und mehr Raum-Wohnungen”). Share Marginal Employees, 65 and Older denotes the
share of employees aged 65 and older, holding a marginal employee position, among all inhabitants
aged 65 to 75 (”Quote geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigte u¨ber 65 Jahre”). Population Share 6 to 18 Years
denotes the share of inhabitants aged 6 to 18 years among the total population (”Einwohner von 6
bis unter 18 Jahren”). Share of young Unemployed denotes the share of unemployed persons under
25 years among all unemployed persons (”Anteil ju¨ngere Arbeitslose”). Daycare Share under 3-Year
Olds denotes the share of children under 3 years enrolled in full-day daycares among all children
under 3 years (”Ganztags-Betreuungsquote Kleinkinder”). Share of Dwellings in Detached Houses
denotes the share of dwelling units that are detached houses among all dwelling units (”Anteil
Wohnung in Ein- und Zweifamilienha¨usern”). Share of Employees in Vocational Training denotes
the share of employees currently in vocational training among all employees (”Auszubildende je
1.000 SV Bescha¨ftigte”).
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While the correlations reported in Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 do not reveal causal channels
through which local labor market characteristics affect intergenerational mobility, they are
nevertheless interesting.
Here, we discuss the results for the absolute mobility measure Q1 reported in Table 2.10
in more detail. The results reported in Table 2.10 suggest that local labor market conditions
can potentially explain (part of the) regional differences in absolute mobility. There is a
negative correlation between the Q1 measure and both, the labor force participation rate of
young people, and the share of vocational training spots. While part of this correlation is of
course mechanical (a young person can either work or go to regular school, but not both),
it hints at the fact that local employment opportunities affect intergenerational mobility.
This is also suggested by the positive correlation between the Q1 measure and the long-term
unemployment share - suggesting that if the local labor market is in a worse shape, children
choose to accumulate more human capital. This is also suggested by the comparatively
large correlation between the Q1 measure and the share of (all) employees with vocational
training. However, the correlations do not reveal whether this is supply- or demand-driven.
Furthermore, the results suggest that local labor markets with a larger share of a marginal-
ized population display worse outcomes - suggested by the (comparatively) high negative
correlation with the share of social aid recipients under 18, and the negative correlation with
the vote share of ”Other Parties”. The results also suggest that absolute intergenerational
mobility is lower in rural areas (as indicated by the correlation with the share of open space
area in a local labor market). The correlation with naturalizations per capita could suggests
that local labor markets with better integration of foreigners (i.e. a less segregated society)
also exhibit higher absolute mobility.
Next, we discuss the correlations of local labor market characteristics with the parental
income gradient. In interpreting these results, keep in mind that high parental income
gradients indicate a low level of relative intergenerational mobility. The results reported in
Table 2.11 reveal some interesting correlations of local labor markets characteristics with
relative mobility rates (i.e. the parental income gradient). Surprisingly, the variable with
the highest (absolute) correlation is the vote share of the conservative parties CDU/CSU
in federal elections. This correlation could be explained by a number factors (e.g. lower
slopes in rural areas, where the conservative party is traditionally stronger) and we do
not attempt to list all potential interpretations of this correlation here. Surprisingly, the
average pension payments are correlated with lower rates of relative mobility, as well as
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the share of female employees with a college degree. We find a negative correlation of the
parental income gradient with the share of large dwellings, and the share of dwellings in
detached houses, suggesting that rural areas generally have lower parental income gradients
(as dwellings are larger on average in rural areas). We again find evidence that local labor
market conditions affect intergenerational mobility, as suggested by the correlation with the
share of employees in vocational training, and the share of young unemployed. Local labor
markets with a larger share of young residents are also described by higher rates of relative
mobility. However, one needs to be cautious when interpreting single correlations, as some
correlations might reflect e.g. differences between federal states, rather than differences
between local labor markets. For example, the (surprisingly) positive correlation between
the daycare share of under 3 year olds and the parental income gradients vanishes when one
uses only within state variation to calculate the correlation45. When controlling for state-
level fixed effects, the correlation between both variables drops to ρ = 0.06. Furthermore,
part of this correlation could also reflect differences between rural and urban areas, or other
omitted local labor market characteristics.
Overall, the correlations reported here suggest that intergenerational mobility differs
between urban and rural local labor markets. Furthermore, the results suggest that local
labor market conditions affect intergenerational mobility. The results also suggest that
(broadly defined) social capital and social cohesion might affect intergenerational mobility.
We again point out that the bivariate correlations reported here, although interesting,
should be interpreted with caution. The bivariate correlations reported here can serve as
a starting point for future research. We suggest various dimensions in which our results
can be extended. First of all, we did not calculate the correlation between our measures of
intergenerational mobility and measures of (income) inequality at the local level. It would
be interesting to investigate whether a ”Great Gatsby Curve” exists between German local
labor markets. Second, it could be very interesting to conduct a multivariate analysis, using
the full information contained in the dataset of local market characteristics. The large
number of local labor market characteristics contained in the data leads to the need of
parsimoniously selecting the covariates included in a multivariate analysis. This could e.g.
be achieved by the regularization methods described in Belloni et al. (2014). Alternatively,
45This is achieved by first regressing the variables on a full set of state dummies, and then calculating the
correlation between residuals from these regressions.
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one can reduce the number of variables into a smaller number of principal components,
similar to Acciari et al. (2019).
2.11 Conclusion
We have used official microcensus data to document intergenerational mobility in Ger-
many. We measure intergenerational mobility by the association between a childs probability
of obtaining an A-Level degree and her parents income rank in the parental income distribu-
tion within our sample. We are the first to present detailed evidence on regional differences
in intergenerational mobility across local labor markets within Germany. Intergenerational
mobility differs greatly between local labor markets. For example, the probability of obtain-
ing an A-Level degree for a child from the bottom quintile of the national income distribution
is 32% in Frankfurt am Main, but only 16% in Munich.
We presented evidence that regional differences in intergenerational mobility can’t be
simply explained by differences in household characteristics across regions. Even when
controlling for a range of household characteristics, regional differences in our measures of
intergenerational mobility are nearly unchanged. This suggests that the place of residence
indeed shapes the economic outcomes of children. We took a first step at describing which
regional characteristics are correlated with our measures of intergenerational mobility. Our
results suggest that intergenerational mobility differs between urban and rural areas, that
local labor market conditions influence intergenerational mobility and that social capital
and social cohesion play a role in shaping intergenerational mobility.
For future research it is a worthwhile endeavor to further investigate which regional
characteristics shape intergenerational mobility. The educational attainment of children
in school greatly shapes their possibilities later in life and we document that educational
attainment in secondary school depends strongly on the place of residence. Understanding
through which channels places matter for intergenerational mobility is not only important
for normative reasons, but can also help to enhance human capital accumulation and hence
economic growth.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Detail on the Construction of Industry-Level Con-
trol Variables
This Section describes the calculation of the industry-level control variables presented
in Table 1.2 in Section 1.6. The exact calculation procedure of the variables is explained
separately for every data source.
Variables calculated from the NBER-CES manufacturing database and (denoted as NBER-
CES in Table 1.2) are calculated in two steps. First, the industry average (of the respective
variable) is calculated separately for every year of the data. Industry-level averages of ratios
are always calculated by first calculating industry-level totals of variables used in the cal-
culation of the ratio, and then taking the ratio of the industry-level totals of the respective
variables. In a second step, the final control variable is calculated as the time average of
the yearly industry-averages in the sample.
Variables calculated based on yearly Compustat data are calculated in a similar fashion.
First, firm-level observations are aggregated to the industry-level separately for every year
of the data. This is done by summing firm-level variables at the industry-level. Ratios
are then calculated based on industry-level totals of the variables. The final industry-level
control variables are calculated as the time average of the yearly industry-level observations
over all sample years. Following Ottonello and Winberry (2018), firms with a leverage ratio
larger than 10 are dropped from the sample. Only US-based firms are used to calculate
industry-level variables.
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Detailed Summary Statistics for the Frequency of Price Adjustment
N mean sd min max p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
FPA 205 23.37 14.20 4.01 87.53 9.79 11.52 15.08 19.22 25.89 41.68 52.28
This Table reports the summary statistics for the frequency of price adjustment (FPA) at the
industry level. p5 to p95 denote the respective percentiles of the distribution within the sample.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N mean sd p5 p95
Frequency of Price Adjustment 205 23.37 14.20 9.797 52.28
Durable Goods Dummy 205 0.522 0.501 0 1
Capital intensity 187 0.0312 0.0158 0.0114 0.0631
Inventory/Sales 187 0.124 0.0641 0.0443 0.202
Labor Cost over Sales 187 0.163 0.0709 0.0576 0.274
Firm Size 202 116.2 129.8 19.34 362.3
Leverage 200 0.595 0.126 0.386 0.796
Interest Expense Ratio 202 0.0359 0.0387 0.0104 0.122
Short-Term Debt Ratio 202 0.0588 0.0326 0.0236 0.125
Cyclicality 205 0.917 0.948 -0.0770 2.798
Standard Dev. of Output Growth 205 3.272 2.144 1.144 7.866
This Table reports the summary statistics for the additional industry-level control variables.
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Table A.3: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Alternative Ordering Robustness
Check
(1) (2) (3)
h = 18 Months h = 24 Months h = 30 Months
Log(FPA) 0.547** 0.653*** 0.590**
(0.252) (0.250) (0.241)
Inventory/Sales 2.817*** 3.093*** 2.526***
(0.867) (0.913) (0.960)
Labor Costs/Sales 2.699 2.533 2.425
(1.705) (1.931) (1.991)
Capital Int. -5.000 -6.346 -6.597
(4.169) (4.496) (4.959)
Firm Size 0.0510 0.0276 0.0388
(0.0833) (0.0864) (0.0833)
Interest Expense Ratio -3.184 -3.468 -4.105
(1.979) (2.490) (2.600)
Leverage 0.773 1.485* 1.712**
(0.775) (0.809) (0.790)
Short-Term Debt Ratio -1.960 -2.710 -2.805
(2.074) (2.269) (2.257)
Cyclicality -0.215*** -0.283*** -0.297***
(0.0821) (0.0883) (0.0865)
Std(Output Growth) 0.0129 0.0422 0.0741
(0.0524) (0.0541) (0.0484)
Durability -0.269 -0.281 -0.194
(0.175) (0.189) (0.187)
Observations 186 186 186
R-squared 0.115 0.149 0.155
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the estimation results when estimating Equation 1.11 at different horizons h in
the Alternative Ordering Robustness Check. The constant term is not reported. Robust standard
errors are reported in Parenthesis.
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Table A.4: Price Stickiness and Monetary Policy Responses - Alternative Shock Identification
Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3)
h = 18 Months h = 24 Months h = 30 Months
Log(FPA) 0.717** 0.530*** 0.208*
(0.306) (0.180) (0.120)
Inventory/Sales 1.685 0.234 -0.175
(1.126) (1.085) (0.720)
Labor Costs/Sales 0.419 1.253 1.884*
(1.211) (0.986) (0.982)
Capital Int. -4.302 -6.158 -10.57*
(3.920) (3.872) (5.384)
Firm Size 0.0915 0.0733 0.0689
(0.0951) (0.0813) (0.0663)
Interest Expense Ratio 0.595 -1.529 -2.320*
(2.075) (1.766) (1.377)
Leverage 0.579 0.684 0.985**
(0.642) (0.550) (0.461)
Short-Term Debt Ratio -2.614 -1.566 -2.281
(1.624) (1.535) (1.897)
Cyclicality -0.101* -0.0488 -0.0245
(0.0554) (0.0549) (0.0489)
Std(Output Growth) -0.0309 0.00504 0.0253
(0.0367) (0.0317) (0.0278)
Durability -0.0765 -0.0935 -0.0849
(0.111) (0.113) (0.109)
Observations 186 186 186
R-squared 0.203 0.131 0.100
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table reports the estimation results when estimating Equation 1.11 at different horizons h
in the Alternative Shock Identification Robustness Check. The constant term is not reported.
Robust standard errors are reported in Parenthesis.
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A.3 Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of the Frequency of Price Adjustment
This Figure shows the with-in sample distribution of the frequency of price adjustment (FPA, left
Panel) and the log of the frequency of price adjustment (right Panel) of the 205 industries in the
sample.
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Figure A.2: Monetary Policy Shock Series
This Figure shows the time series of the monetary policy shock series used in the paper. The blue
line is the monetary shock series of Barakchian and Crowe (2013). The red line shows the shock
series of Miranda-Agrippino (2016). Both series are standardized with mean zero and a standard
deviation of one. The y-axis is expressed in units of standard deviations of the shock.
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Figure A.3: Response of other Variables to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Structural VAR (Monthly data, 5 endogenous variables, 12 lags). Variables ordered as industrial
production (in logs), unemployment rate, consumer price index (in logs), commodity price index (in
logs) (all seasonally adjusted) and the cumulated shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
Graphs show the responses of the variables in the system (excluding industrial production) to a
one standard deviation increase to the policy measure. Structural shocks obtained via Cholesky
decomposition. Bootstrapped 90% Confidence Intervals based on 5000 Bootstrap Replications are
shown in the red, dotted lines.
127
Figure A.4: Scatterplot of Industry Responses 24 Months after a Monetary Policy Shock vs
log(FPA)
This Figure shows the scatter plot of the cumulative output response of the 205 different industries
to a one standard deviation contractionary policy shock at a horizon of 24 Months after the
shock plotted against the log of the frequency of price adjustment of the industry. Each blue dot
represents a single industry. On the X-axis, the log of the frequency of price adjustment is shown.
On the Y-Axis, the cumulative output response, reported in percent, to a one Standard Deviation
contractionary Monetary Policy Shock is shown, 24 Months after the shock has happened. The
red line shows the linear fit.
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Figure A.5: Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock - Alternative Ordering
Structural VAR (Monthly data, 5 endogenous variables, 12 lags). Variables ordered as the cumu-
lated shock measure of Barakchian and Crowe (2013), industrial production (in logs), unemploy-
ment rate, consumer price index (in logs), and a commodity price index (in logs) (all seasonally
adjusted). Graphs show the responses of the variables in the system to a one standard deviation
increase to the policy measure. Bootstrapped 90% Confidence Intervals based on 5000 Bootstrap
Replications are shown in the red, dotted lines.
Figure A.6: Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock - Alternative Shock Identifi-
cation
Structural VAR (Monthly data, 5 endogenous variables, 12 lags). Variables ordered as industrial
production (in logs), unemployment rate, consumer price index (in logs), commodity price index
(in logs) (all seasonally adjusted) and the cumulated shock measure of Miranda-Agrippino (2016).
Graphs show the responses of the variables in the system to a one standard deviation increase to
the policy measure. Structural shocks obtained via Cholesky decomposition. Bootstrapped 90%
Confidence Intervals based on 5000 Bootstrap Replications are shown in the red, dotted lines.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 State-Level Differences in the A-Level Wage Pre-
mium
In this Section, we describe how we estimate the A-Level wage premium in our data
and how estimates of the A-Level wage premium differ across states (”Bundesla¨nder”) in
Germany.1
In the estimation of A-Level wage premia, we restrict our sample to individuals aged 30
to 45, working full time. All estimations of A-Level wage premia are based on the waves
2009 to 2014 of the MZ. We focus on individuals aged 30 to 45 to estimate the A-Level wage
premium for recent cohorts in prime working age.
We measure income as monthly personal net income (of the individual). Income is
measured as continuous variable, imputed based on reported binned income (see Section
B.2 for details on the imputation procedure). We focus on individuals working full time as
labor income should make up the largest share of net income for these individuals.
We express all incomes in 2009 Euros (i.e. we adjust reported income for inflation) and
pool observations across all waves. We use log income as the dependent variable in our
estimations of A-Level wage premia2.
1We focus on differences in the A-Level wage premium across states rather than differences across LLM’s
as the school system is regulated at the state-level.
2We drop individuals with a reported monthly personal net income of 0. As discussed before, the income
of individuals working as farmers is recorded as zero in our data, hence a reported net income of zero rather
indicates a farmer, than a real net income of zero. Furthermore, as we focus on individuals working full
time, a net income of zero is not plausible.
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We estimate the A-Level wage premium using the following specification:
log(yi,t) = α + βI(A− Leveli,t) + γaIa + δtIt + i,t (B.1)
Here, log(yi,t) is the log of the net monthly personal income of individual i observed in
wave t, I(A − Leveli,t) is a binary indicator, indicating whether the person i (observed in
wave t) has an A-Level degree or not, Ia is a full set of age dummies (16 age dummies, as
we focus on individuals ages 30 to 45) to control for the age profile of income and It are
wave fixed effects, indicating the wave of the MZ used (5 wave dummies, 2009 is used as
base category).
In the full sample, we obtain an estimate of β = .367, implying an A-Level wage pre-
mium(given by exp(β)− 1) of around 44% for monthly net income.
Next, we estimate the A-Level wage premium separately for each state. In this estimation,
we restrict the age profile of income and wave fixed effects to be the same in every state,
i.e. we estimate:
log(yi,t) =
16∑
k=1
αkI(Statei = k) +
16∑
k=1
βkI(A−Leveli,t, Statei = k) + γaIa + δtIt + i,t (B.2)
where k = 1, ..., 16 denotes the subscript for the state of residence, I(Statei = k) is an
indicator function equal to one if individual i is living in state k and I(A−Leveli,t, Statei =
k) is an indicator function equal to one if individual i is living in state k and has an A-Level
degree, and zero otherwise. Note that state here refers to the current state of residence (at
the point in time when the individual is observed), not the state where the A-Level degree
was obtained (this information is not recorded in our data).
The estimates of state-specific A-Level wage premia are reported in Table B.1. We report
the estimates of βk obtained when estimating Equation B.2, and the implied A-Level wage
premium exp(βk)− 1.
Table B.1 shows that state-level differences in the observed A-Level wage premium exist
but are rather small, compared to the size of the national A-Level wage premium. The
lowest state-specific A-Level wage premium (Bremen, around 36% A-Level wage premium)
is around 8 percentage points lower than the national A-Level wage premium. The highest
state-specific A-Level wage premium (Bavaria, round 48%) is around 4 percentage points
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Table B.1: State-Specific A-Level Wage Premia
State Name βk A-Level Wage Premium
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg .344 .411
Bayern .397 .488
Berlin .353 .424
Brandenburg .358 .430
Bremen .307 .359
Hamburg .396 .485
Hessen .350 .419
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern .373 .452
Niedersachsen .332 .394
Nordrhein-Westfalen .323 .381
Rheinland-Pfalz .370 .447
Saarland .311 .365
Sachsen .379 .461
Sachsen-Anhalt .353 .423
Schleswig-Holstein .370 .449
Thu¨ringen .366 .442
higher than the nation-wide A-Level wage premium. In most states, the observed A-Level
wage premium is rather similar.
These results suggest a substantial wage premium associated with an A-Level degree,
regardless of the state of residence. Our results provide evidence that differences in the
A-Level wage premium are rather small across states, compared to the size of the A-Level
wage premium.
To our knowledge, no study exists on differences in the return to an A-Level degree
obtained in different German States.
B.2 Details on Income Imputation
This Section describes how total household income is imputed in the MZ, and how our
measure of parental income is constructed.
First, every household member reports her personal income (including all sources of
income, net of tax and social security contributions) individually. If a household member has
no personal income, this is recorded as zero personal income. If personal income is positive,
income is reported in binned format. Choosing out of 24 pre-defined bins, individuals state
the bin in which her personal income falls. The most common bin sizes3 are 199 Euro and
3bin size means the difference between the upper and the lower bound of a bin
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299 Euro. Bin sizes vary between 149 Euro (for the two lowest income bins) and 7999 Euro
(for the second highest income bin). The highest income bin (for a monthly income higher
than 18000 Euro) is open ended. The exact definition of the income bins can be found in
Table B.2.
Table B.2: Income Bin Sizes used in the MZ
Income Bin Lower Bound (Euro) Upper Bound (EURO)
1 1 149
2 150 299
3 300 499
4 500 699
5 700 899
6 900 1099
7 1100 1299
8 1300 1499
9 1500 1699
10 1700 1999
11 2000 2299
12 2300 2599
13 2600 2899
14 2900 3199
15 3200 3599
16 3600 3999
17 4000 4499
18 4500 4999
19 5000 5499
20 5500 5999
21 6000 7499
22 7500 9999
23 10000 17999
24 18000 ∞
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Next, based on the reported (binned) personal income of all household members, total
household income is imputed. For every household member with positive personal income,
the binned income is transformed into a continuous income variable. The continuous mea-
sure of personal income is imputed using the following formula:
NEi,b = Ab + Zi ∗Bb (B.3)
where NEi,b is the imputed personal income of individual i, who reported a personal income
within income bin b. Ab and Bb are bin-specific parameters, chosen by the statistical office.
Zi is a random variable, drawn from a discrete uniform distribution from the natural numbers
in the interval [0, 99]. The bin-specific parameters are reported in Table B.3. The result of
this procedure is a continuous measure of personal income.
Total household income is then calculated as the sum of the imputed personal income of
all household members. The imputation procedure is carried out by the Statistical Office.
The result of this imputation procedure is a continuous measure of household income, which
we use in our further analysis.
If at least on member of the household is working as self-employed farmer (
”
Landwirt/-
in (selbststa¨ndig in der Hauptta¨tigkeit)“), total household income is not reported for this
household, and income is imputed as zero. Hence an imputed income of zero indicates a
self-employed farmer, rather than a true zero. Furthermore, as income here includes income
from all sources, the German social safety net makes it (nearly) impossible to have a net
income of zero (after all transfers). Due to this reason, we choose to drop households with
total household income recorded zero income from the analysis.
Total household income reported in the MZ is the sum of the personal income of all
household members. It includes not only parental income, but also the personal income of
all children present in the household. In our analysis, we want to focus on parental income.
In order to focus on parental income, we subtract the income of all dependent children
present in the household from total household income. For children with positive personal
income, we observe the income bin of the child. We assign every child the mid-point of its
respective income bin. We sum the income of all children at the household level, call this
total children income. We subtract total children income from total household income to
obtain total parental income.
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Table B.3: Bin-Specific Parameters used for Income Imputation in the MZ
Income Bin Ab Bb
1 50 1.0
2 151 1.5
3 301 2.0
4 501 2.0
5 701 2.0
6 901 2.0
7 1101 2.0
8 1301 2.0
9 1501 2.0
10 1702 3.0
11 2002 3.0
12 2302 3.0
13 2602 3.0
14 2902 3.0
15 3203 4.0
16 3603 4.0
17 4004 5.0
18 4504 5.0
19 5004 5.0
20 5504 5.0
21 6014 15.0
22 7515 25.0
23 10040 80.0
24 18002 2.0
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B.3 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Average Household Size per Income Percentile: No Adjustment for Household Size
This figure shows the average household size vs. the percentile rank in the national parental income
distribution when income is not adjusted for household size. The figure is constructed by binning
parent rank into one-percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the average
household size in each bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. The figure is based on N = 268523
children living with their parents.
137
Figure B.2: Household Income 2014 vs Income Percentiles: No Adjustment for Household Size
This figure shows the Euro amount of the upper bound of each income percentile bin vs. the per-
centile rank in the national parental income distribution when income is not adjusted for household
size. The figure is constructed by binning parent income rank into one-percentile point bins (so
that there are 100 bins) and plotting the upper bound of each percentile bin vs. the parent rank
in each bin. This Figure is based on the 2014 wave of the MZ.
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Figure B.3: Household Income 2014 vs Income Percentiles: Income per Household Member
This figure shows the Euro amount of the upper bound of each income percentile bin vs. the
percentile rank in the national parental income distribution when income is divided by the number
of household members. The figure is constructed by binning parent income rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the upper bound of each percentile bin vs. the
parent rank in each bin. This Figure is based on the 2014 wave of the MZ.
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Figure B.4: Household Income 2014 vs Income Percentiles: Equivalence Scale Income
This figure shows the Euro amount of the upper bound of each income percentile bin vs. the
percentile rank in the national parental income distribution when income is divided by the square
root of the number of household members (equivalence scale approach). The figure is constructed
by binning parent income rank into one-percentile point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and
plotting the upper bound of each percentile bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. This Figure is
based on the 2014 wave of the MZ.
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Figure B.5: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Equivalence Scale Income
This figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank in the national parental income distribution when parental income divided by the square root
of household size (x-axis). The figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-22 currently
enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all
children in the income bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. The figure is based on N = 268523
children living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income
rank in the underlying micro-data (black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0048 and a constant
of 0.159.
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Figure B.6: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Income per Household Member,
Children Aged 16 to 19
This figure plots the fraction of children aged 16-19 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank in the national parental income distribution when parental income divided by the square root
of household size (x-axis). The figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 16-19 currently
enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all
children in the income bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. The figure is based on N = 171441
children living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income
rank in the underlying micro-data (black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0046 and a constant
of 0.137.
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Figure B.7: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Income per Household Member,
Children Aged 17 to 20
This figure plots the fraction of children aged 17-20 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank in the national parental income distribution when parental income divided by the square root
of household size (x-axis). The figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 17-20 currently
enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all
children in the income bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. The figure is based on N = 163903
children living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income
rank in the underlying micro-data (black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0050 and a constant
of 0.179.
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Figure B.8: Intergenerational Mobility at the National Level: Income per Household Member,
Children Aged 20 to 22
This figure plots the fraction of children aged 20-22 (y-axis) that are either enrolled in the last
two/three years of the A-Level track or already completed the A-Level degree vs. the percentile
rank in the national parental income distribution when parental income divided by the square root
of household size (x-axis). The figure is constructed by binning parent rank into one-percentile
point bins (so that there are 100 bins) and plotting the fraction of children aged 20-22 currently
enrolled in the last two/three years of the A-Level track or having already completed it among all
children in the income bin vs. the parent rank in each bin. The figure is based on N = 97082
children living with their parents. The OLS regression of the A-Level dummy on the parent income
rank in the underlying micro-data (black line) yields a slope coefficient of 0.0052 and a constant
of 0.205.
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Figure B.9: Baseline Probability α Across LLM’s in Germany
This Figure shows estimates of the baseline probability of obtaining an A-Level degree α (i.e. the
constant estimated in Equation 2.8), estimated separately for every local labor market in Germany.
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